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'D,. $ CU.SJ 
February 20, 1976 Conference 
List 5, Sheet 2 
No. 75-708 
Ques/,o-n MARKS, et al. 
.1- h1a.4/ k, 
e/ttJ - fl,~~ v. 
/J a r'Y«cf.uNITED STATES 
tA ~ .s t!.ntc/v s lo,, 
Cert to CA 6 
(Weick, McCree, Engel) 
Federal/ criminal 
Timely 
yl,,«/ ,'Attst!. /i/m / Pet rs raise several objections to their federal obscenity convictions, 
(V()(.lllk . 
o/Js~nc affirmed by CA 6: ( 1) the jury was instructed to apply the Miller test of obscenity, 
Mtlu lt>M 
ell(,() ,tO/ rather than the Roth-Memoirs test, to this pre-Miller conduct; (2) the appellate 
~~~ - . 
jOl'tJl,b,,n I judges failed personally to view the material in question to determine whether it 
tu fu:t 
J/uuld/J.L was obscene; and (3) the jury was instructed that it should apply the community 
'7tt :1.~dards of the Eastern District of Kentucky, not lhos e of the Cincinnati metro-
4'Ad"'7'1>c,,u/Jpolitan area. This case is straight-lined with No. 75-707, Sanders v. Georgia, 
ltt4b IU ~ti -
~ - appare11tly because both cases involv; the .film 11 ~eep_ Tiroat. 11 
IS 16-1 U/.1.Lt. cS kuJ f~fA. ftft'!i:f/':fdt~ ~ ui_ 
- 2 -
1. FACTS: Petrs were indicted for conspiracy and for eight substantive 
counts of transporting obscene films interstate for the purposes of sale and 
distribution, in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1465. The films involved were "Deep 
Throat," "Swing High, 11 and six previews with similar titles. Their contents are 
described in detail in the CA 6 opinion, petn., p. A 3. All petrs were convicted 
of conspiracy and acquitted on one of the substantive counts; all but one (a company) 
were convicted of the seven other substantive counts. 
The trial judge (Swinton, E. D. Ky.) instructed the jury to apply the Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), test of obscenity (the work taken as a whole lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value), instead of the Roth-
Memoirs test (the material is utterly without redeeming social value). The judge 
also instructed the jury to apply the community standards of the Eastern District 
of Kentucky; he did, however, permit evidence of what the community standards of 
the Cincinnati area were. 
On appeal, CA 6 affirmed. The court did not view the films, but looked 
instead to the detailed search-warrant affidavits and other descriptions of the 
; ,. 
material. It concluded, insofar as is here relevant, that the judge properly 
limited the community area to the Eastern District of Kentucky, under Hamling v . 
United States , 418 U.S. 87 (1974). The court also r ejected petrs' argument that 
the trial judge should have instructed the jury on only the Roth-Memoirs test, but 
the court's 'holding in this regard is not entirely clear. First, CA 6 noted that 
several circuits have held that the Roth - Memoirs instruction must be given in ca ses 
where pre-Miller offenses are charged, and d.eclined to follow those cases; it took 
its lead from the fact that in Miller its elf the Court remanded for retrial under the 
- 3 -
new, Miller standard. CA 6 also noted that in Hamling this Court had referred to 
Miller as simply a "clarifying gloss" on a similar federal statute, 418 U.S., at 
116, in order to reject the claim that the statute as applied before Miller was 
impermis sibly vague. Second, the court concluded that the application of the 
Roth-Memoirs test would not have helped petrs, since these films were in fact 
obscene under either standard. Judge McCree dissented; he would have remanded 
for a new trial with a Roth-Memoirs standard. 
2. CONTENTIONS: Petrs argue that the Miller charge denied them due 
process, citing the CA decisions that conflict with CA 6 1 s decision in this case. 
United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361 (CA DC 1975); United States v. 
Wasserman, 504 F. 2d 1012 (CA 5 1974); United States v. Jacobs, 513 F. 2d 564 
(CA 9 1975). Those courts generally reasoned "that the Roth-Memoirs gloss on 
'obscenity' did not give appellant adequate notice that his conduct would be judged 
by the expanded standard ultimately applied, 11 513 F. 2d, at 565 (CA 9), because 
Miller had enlarged the coverage of the statute. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347 (1964). The SG admits the conflict, but argues that there is no reason 
~ ; , 
to resolve it here, since CA 6 concluded that even under Roth-Memoirs, the films 
were obscene. He also argues that the issue will fade away as Miller ages. 
Petr-s argue that CA_ 6 was constitutionally required to view the film, citing 
_;;:_-----~ ,,,_.,, =--== --" ~ ~ 
cases in which this Court has done so. See, ~·, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. ~ ' 
370 U.S. 478 (1962); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). The SG argues that -
1 ~ this Court has never so held, although individual Justices have accepted the 
proposition, Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 162 (Brennan, J., concurring in the result). 
Petrs also claim a conflict on this point with Clicque v. United States, 514 F. 2d 
923 (CA 5 1975). Here CA 6 adequately informed itself a 's to the contents of the 
.. - 4 -
films, and petrs had all the appellate review to which they were entitled. Clicque 
is not to the contrary, since the court there held only that a DC must m ake a deter-
mination that the material is obscene in accepting a guilty plea to an obsc enity 
charge. 
Finally, petrs argue that the judge should have instructed the jury to apply 
the community standards of the Cincinnati area, not the Eastern District of 
Kentucky. Many of the jurors worked in Cincinnati; none were familiar with the 
"standards" in the rural parts of the judicial district. The SG argues that the 
instruction was within the latitude given district judges by Hamling v. United Sta tes. 
418 U.S. 87, 105-106 (1974). 
3. DISCUSSION: On the first point, CA 6 1 s alternative conclusion remov es 
the conflict. If the films are actually obscene under the Roth-Memoirs test, then 
petrs were on adequate notice that their conduct violated the law. Their conviction 
by a federal jury charged under the Miller test might raise serious Seventh Amend -
~"'"-> 
ment problems,l\.since CA 6 appears to have rested its affirmance on the application 
of a rather different test. None of the CAs in the "conflicting" decisions to5>k,. 
CA 6' s tack. Only CA 5 declined to do so exp res sly: "[I]t would be inappropriate 
for this court to usurp the jury function of applying the Roth-Memoirs test to the 
materials at issue." 504 F.2d, at 1016 n. 11. Nor do the Miller remand, and the 
DWSFQ entered in Miller II, 418 U.S. 915 (1974), implicitly decide the issue, 
since the defendants in cases of that vintage were first convicted when the Roth-
Memoirs tes;p~. Judge McCree suggested this point in his dissent, but pe trs 
do not argue it at all here. 
The SG seems to be correct with respect to the other points. 
There is a response. 







No. 75-708, Marks, et al, v. United States 
This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look at 
the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will 
refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study 
of the case prior to argument and decision. When an opinion is 
expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative. 
* * * * * 
This is an obscenity case that presents the following 
three questions: 
1. Whether in an obscenity prosecution 
that took place after Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, for conduct that occurred before 
~hat decision, the district court properly charged 
the jury under the standards announced in that 
decision. 
2. Whether a court of appeals must view 
the materials in order to determine whether 
they are protected by the First Amendment. 
3. Whether the jury was properly in-
structed to assess the materials in terms of 
the community standards of the judicial dis-
trict from which the jurors were selected and 
in which the trial was held. 
No. 75-708 2. 
( Petitioners were indicted, tried and convicted on 
several counts for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1465, for knowingly 
transporting in commerce obscene films, and also were convicted 
for conspiring to violate§ 1465. But, as the SG's brief notes, 
petitioners were "caught in a period of transition." Their con-
duct took place prior to Miller, and their trial took place after 
that decision. 
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, as I recall it, to resolve a conflict among the 
circuits as to whether the Miller standards -- to the extent they 
differ from the Memoirs/Roth standards, apply retroactively. 
( Although the Solicitor General opposed the granting of cert, and 
( 
appeared to think at that time that the retroactivity issue was 
insubstantial, he now agrees with petitioners that CA6 erred in 
appr9ving -- in effect -- such a retroactive application. CA6 
(McRee, dissenting) held that the particular films in question 
(De~p Throat, etc.) were obscene under any standard. But, as 
pointed out in Judge McRee's dissent, the jury was instructed only 
• 
under the Miller standard. It therefore was not possible for 
reviewing courts to be sure what the jury would have concluded had 
it been properly instructed. 
Bu~, the parties are in agreement in this Court that 




No. 75-708 3. 
The SG also agrees with petitioners that a court of 
appeals must view films (or other material alleged to be obscene) 
in order to determine whether they are protected by the First 
Amendment. Thus, on the second question, the parties are in 
agreement and no controversy remains. 
The only remaining issue is whether the jury was properly 
instructed to apply the contemporary community standards of the 
judicial district in which the trial took place rather than 
charge the jury on the local community standards of the Cincinnati-
Covington metropolitan area. The parties do disagree on this issue, 
and I am inclined to think the SG has the better of the argument. 
There is language in Hamlin (418 !U.S. at 105-06) that 
supports the view that ordinarily the judicial district in which 
the trial takes place constitutes the relevant community. Jurors 
are drawn from the district, and may be presumed to know as much 
about community standards as jurors drawn from some particular 
segment of the district. This may not always be the case, but I 
doubt whether_ this type of difference attains constitutional 
dimensions. 
This case involved moving pictures being shown in local 
theaters in Covington, Kentucky, which is within the metropolitan 
area of Cincinnati. 
* * * * 
No. 75-708 4. 
( The SG's brief, agreeing with petitioners on what I 
( 
( 
thought was the principal issue in this case, considerably under-
mines its importance. Subject to f~rther consideration, I think 
the case could be disposed of by a per curiam opinion. 
The "cormjmnity standards" issue is not free from 
difficulty, but I know of no really satisfactory solution. In 
a country as large and diverse as ours, there are relatively few 
national standards with respect to arguably obscene material that 
fairly could be applied everywhere. The standards of Times 
Square in New York would create a riot in the Ozark Mountains. 
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No. 75-708, Marks, et al, v. United States 
This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look at 
the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will 
refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study 
of the case prior to argument and decision. When an opinion is 
expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative. 
* * * * * 
This is an obscenity case that presents the following 
three questions: 
1. Whether in an obscenity prosecution 
that took place after Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, for conduct that occurred before 
that decision, the district court properly charged 
the jury under the standards announced in that 
decision. 
2. Whether a court of appeals must view 
the materials in order to determine whether 
they are protected by the First Amendment~ 
3. Whether the jury was properly in-
structed to assess the materials in terms of 
the community standards of the judicial dis-
trict from which the jurors were selected and 
in which the trial was held. 
No. 75-708 2. 
Petitioners were indicted, tried and convicted on 
several counts for violating 18 u.s.c. § 1465, for knowingly 
transporting in commerce obscene films., and also were convicted 
for conspiring to violate§ 1465. But, as the SG's brief notes, 
petitioners were "caught in a period of transition." Their con-
duct took place prior to Miller, and their trial took place after 
that decision. 
We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit, as I recall it, to resolve a conflict among the 
circuits as to whether the Miller standards -- to the extent they 
differ from the Memoirs/Roth standards, apply retroactively. 
Although the Solicitor General opposed the granting of cert, and 
appeared to think at that time that the retroactivity issue was 
insubstantial, he now agrees with petitioners that CA6 erred in 
approving -- in effect -- such a retroactive application. CA6 
(McRee, dissenting) held that the particular films in question 
(De~p Throat, etc.) were obscene under any standard. But, as 
pointed out in Judge McRee's dissent, the jury was instructed only 
under the Miller standard. It therefore was not possible for 
reviewing courts to be sure what the jury would have concluded had 
it been properly instructed. 
But, the parties are in agreement in this Court that 
there was reversible error on the retroactivity issue. 
4 ' 
No. 75-708 3. 
The SG also agrees with petitioners that a court of 
appeals must view films (or other material alleged to be obscene) 
in order to determine whether they are protected by the First 
Amendment. Thus, on the second question, the parties are in 
agreement and no controversy remains. 
The only remaining issue is whether the jury was properly 
instructed to apply the contemporary community standards of the 
judicial district in which the trial took place rather than 
charge the jury on the local community standards of the Cincinnati-
Covington metropolitan area. The parties do disagree on this issue, 
and I am inclined to think the SG has the better of the argument. 
There is language in Hamlin (418 U.S. at 105-06) that 
supports the view that ordinarily the judicial district in which 
the trial takes place constitutes the relevant community. Jurors 
are drawn from the district, and may be presumed to know as much 
about community standards as jurors drawn from some particular 
segment of the district. This may not always be the case, but I 
doubt whether this type of difference attains constitutional 
dimensions. 
This case involved moving pictures being shown in local 
theaters in Covington, Kentucky, which is within the metropolitan 
area of Cincinnati. 
* * * * 
No. 75-708 4. 
The SG's brief, agreeing with petitioners on what I 
thought was the principal issue in this case, considerably under-
mines its importance. Subject to f~rther consideration, I think 
the case could be disposed of by a per curiam opinion. 
The "comIJlunity standards" issue is not free from 
difficulty, but I know of no really satisfactory solution. In 
a country as large and diverse as ours, there are relatively few 
national standards with respect to arguably obscene material that 
fairly could be applied everywhere. The standards of Times 
Square in New York would create a riot in the Ozark Mountains. 
' .. 
., 




4~~ ~' BENCH MEMO 
TO: 
FROM: 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Dave Martin )J.\ 
DATE: August 30, 1976 
No. 75-708 Marks v. United States 
The major issue here concerns a transition problem in 
moving from Roth/Memoirs to Miller v. California. The other 
two issues provide an opportunity to clarify a few lingerging 
questions after Miller - but it may not be necessary to reach 
both of them. The SG now agrees with petitioner on two of the 
three issues. Hence it might be possible to dispose of the case ----with a fairly brief per curiam taking care to avoid one minor 
..... - --- - --------------hidden snare when dealing with the first issue. I recommend 
(1) holding that Miller does not apply retroactively to the 
detriment of the defendant, being careful to do so in a narrowly 
circumscribed fashion so as not toopen the floodgates to 
problems under Bouie v. City of Columbia; (2) making it clear 
that an appellate court must view the allegedly obscene materials 
when properly requested to do so; (3) approving the district 
court's instructions defining the community whose standards are 
to be applied. 
I. Facts 
Petitioners were convicted in the Eastern District of 
Kentucky of conspiracy to transport obscene materials (the 
films "Deep Throat and "Swing High" and seven preview clips) 
in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 371, and of the substantive 
2. 
offense of transporting, id. § 1465. They had brought the 
films into Newport, Ky., a part of the Cincinnati metropolitan 
area, to show at Cinema X, a theatre owned by one of the 
petitioners. The conduct that founded the charge covered a 
period up through February 27, 1973, but the trial did not begin 
until the following October. In the interim this Court decided 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (June 21, 1973), and its 
compani on cases. 
The trial court, over petitioners' objections, instructed 
the jury under Miller standards, defining the relevant community 
as the entire Eastern District of Kentucky. The jury found 
them guilty, and they were sentenced to 90 days in jail and 
(Weick, Engel in the majority) 
heavy fines. A divided CA6/approved, swimming against the tide 
1 
of cases from other circuits, which had all required instructions 
reflecting Roth/Memoirs standards for indictments relating to 
pre-Miller conduct (Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, and 
Memoirs v. Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (plurality opinion)). In addition, 
CA6 held that the materials were obscene under any definition of 
obscenity - but CA6 never viewed the films. Apparently it reliBd 
on a detailed and exhaustive description of the films (at least 
of the sexual activities portrayed) contained in the affidavit 
of an FBI agent. JA 14. That affidavit was part of the record 
because it had formed the basis for the warrant commanding 
seizure of the films. 
Judge Mccr e e dissented. Petitioners were entitled>in 
his view, to Roth/Memoirs instructions. In addition, it is a 
footnote to his dissent which reveals that CA6 never saw the 
films. He objects to the majority's speculation that the 
films were obscene under any standard, arguing that such 
speculation denies the right to trial by jury. 
Petitioner raises three questions here, and the SG, 
although he opposed cert, has come around to agree with 
petitioner on the first two. 
II. Issues 
A. Jury instructions: Miller or Roth/Memoirs? 
The first question is whether petitioners were entitled 
3. 
to instructions under Roth/Memoirs since all their conduct 
occurred prior to Miller. Naturally attention focuses on the 
third part of the test: under the view of the Memoirs plurality, 
building on certain language in Roth, material is constitutionally 
protected unless it "is utterly without redeeming social value," 
383 U.S. at 418; under Miller the test is "whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value," 413 U.S. at 24. 
Petitioners a ssert that Miller changed the law and expand;d 
the statute's reach. Indeed, they point out, the third part of 
the test was explicitly adopted to ease the prosecutor's burden. 
413 U.S. at 22. The effect of Miller is therefore indistinguish-
able from the impact of an ex post facto law, if it is applied 
to conduct completed before Miller came down. The ex post facto 
clause does not itself apply to judicial decisions, but 
similar due process principles impose similar restrictions. 
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 374. 
4. 
The SG agrees with petitioners' argument on this point, 
but he does offer what he regards as the strongest statement 
of the opposing position - in a sense it spells out more 
carefully the rationale relied on by CA6. The Memoirs standard 
never commanded more than a three-Justice plurality on this 
~sf.. . s+,..wla.rds 
Court. Moreover, ~A.were a significant departure from Roth. 
Hence, no one planning his future conduct could justifiably 
rely on the Memoirs restatement of the tests, but had to rely 
on Roth alone. Miller did not significantly depart from Roth; 
it merely clarified the tests. There has thus been no judicial 
broadening of the statute, and there is nothing on which ex post 
facb principles can operate. 
But the SG, having stated the argument, doesn't buy it, 
and neither do I. Miller did emphasize that the Memoirs 
by 
tests were accepted/only three Justices. This may have made 
it easier for five Justices in Miller to change the formulation, 
but it certainly cannot obscure the fact that the Memoirs te~ts 
were very much alive in the intervening years. They were 
operative because the other two Justices who made up the 
Memoirs majority did not believe that the First Amendment permitted 
suppression of obscene materials at all. (Their position is 
never mentioned by CA6). "[T]he holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred 
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds .... " Gregg v. Georgia, 
at 12 n. 15 (Opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens). 
5. 
It was apparently the Memoirs formulation that was applied 
in the series of per curiam decisions in obscenity cases 
initiated by Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767. And the circuit 
courts that considered the issue before Miller held unanimously 
that jury instructions had to be based on the Memoirs tests. 
(The cases are collected in the SG's brief, at 30 n. 15). 
This consistent circuit court treatment, under United States v. 
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, has to be accorded a good deal of weight 
in deciding whether a new constitutional decision actually 
changed the law. Peltier involved retroactivity for a decision 
(Almeida-Sanchez) that benefited defendants,but I see no reason 
why this portion of that decision should apply any differently 
to a decision like Miller which makes things harder for defendants. 
CA6 did not discuss this factor of circuit court treatment)and 
its conclusion that Miller did not really change the law suffers 
as a result. 
Finally, there cannot be much argument that the change was 
significant, particularly after the trumpeting the new test got 
in the Miller opinion itself. 413 U.S. at 22 (the "utterly without 
redeeming social value" test places on the prosecutor"a burden 
virtually impossible to discharge under 11111a our criminal standards 
of proof"). Clearly it was thought that some conduct which 
would have gone unpunished under Memoirs will now result in 
conviction. 
Since Miller did therefore perform a "judicial enlargement 
of a ··criminal statute," Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 
353, both petitioner and SG have no trouble concluding that, 
6. 
under Bouie, it cannot apply retroactively. I agree with the 
conclusion, but I do not think that Bouie applies quite so 
automatically. The judicial enlargement in Miller was by 
no means such a surprise or so "indefensible," 378 U.S., at 
354, as what the South Carolina Supreme Court had done in Bouie. 
The Miller change really was not all that drastic. I am concerned 
that a hasty reversal citing Bouie will open the doors to Bouie 
challenges whenever a court changes the wording of the instructions 
that are to be given under a broadly phrased criminal statute or 
otherwise performs some minor alteration in the way ai a statute is 
~ construed. Too many such challenges might impede judicial 
flexibility in assuring that the language of a statute gets 
translated into instructions that really do communicate to the 
jury. The need for judicial flexibility was cited by Justice 
Harlan as one important reason why the ex post facto clause 
does not apply of its own force to judicial decisions. James 
v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 247 n. 3 (Harlan, J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
Under review in Bouie were convictions under South Carol!na1S 
criminal trespass statute which forbids entering on the land of 
another after notice forbidding entry. Petitioners there, 
Negroes who were taking part in a sit-in demonstration)had 
entered the restaurant section of a drugstore. There was no 
notice that the restaurant was closed to blacks, but shortly 
after their arrival they were asked to leave. When they refused, 
they were arrested. The ~C.S Ct upheld their convictions, 
construing the statute for the first time to apply to the act 
7. 
of remaining on the premises after receiving notice to leave. 
This Court reversed, holding that an "unforeseeable and retro-
active judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory 
language," 378 U.S. at 352, operated like an ex post facto law, 
and could not be tolerated. 
Bouie was a narrow holding, mentioning at least three 
factors that made reversal appropriate: the changed interpreta-
2 
tion was unforeseeable, it was indefensible, and it ran counter 
to statutory language that seemed clear and precise. The last 
~c.+w.s -+o °'"'°'" +o twoAcannot be said~llf the new interpretation announced in 
Miller, so reversal here will mean a stricter application of 
Bouie to a law-changing decision. 
The opinion here should therefore stress that stricter 
application is appropriate only because the statute at issue 
regulates speech, and the First Amendment demands a more 
exacting application. Bouie, by its own terms, reversed the 
South Carolina court because of the need for fair warning - ~-
fe.J ~ t~Tc.S 
and fair warning is especially important when a statuteh f · g i .... 
--a.speech. To put it another way, Bouie traces its heritage 
; 
to vagueness cases, and traditional vagueness doctrine has 
~ demanded more exacting judicial scrutiny when a statute impinges 
on protected speech. See,~·&·, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 
573. In this way the impact of this particular nonretroactivity 
3 
holding can be confined to speech-related statutes. Cf. Rabe 
v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (applying Bouie principles - without 
ever citing Bouie - to reverse a state obscenity conviction, 
stressing lack of fair notice of the state court's new construction 
of the statute). 
-----
8. 
What I have suggested is consistent with Hamling v. 
United States, 418 U.S. 87, even though certain language out 
of Hamling helped throw CA6 off the track. If Hamling had been 
a little more explicit, it might have obviated the problems that 
arose in this case. 
The Hamling petitioners' conduct and trial both occurred 
before Miller. The charge to the jury set forth the Roth/Memoirs 
standards. This Court held that "any constitutional principle 
enunciated in Miller which would serve to benefit petitioners 
must be applied in their case." Id. at 102. (emphasis added). 
Yet it seems fairly clear that any benefits resulting from 
Memoirs also had to be retained. The Court examined the record 
and determined that the jury could constitutionally have found 
the materials obscene under the Memoirs test. Id. at 100. 
It did not finesse that inquiry on the grounds that Memoirs 
had no relevance - something it clearly might have done if 
4 
Miller applied retroactively in all respects. 
Hamling did discuss the applicability of Bouie with regard 
to one element of the obscenity offense. Under Miller there 
must be an explicit enumeration of specific types of sexual 
conduct, the depiction of which will be considered obscene if 
all the other tests are also met. 413 U.S. at 24. That 
enumeration must appear in the statute or in authoritative 
judicial construction. And Miller, id. at 25, along with the 
companion case of United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 
; 
413 U.S. 123, 130 n. 7, established that construction 
for the federal obscenity statutes. 
9. 
That construction had not been performed at the time the 
Hamling petitioners committed the acIB for which they were charged. 
Consequently they argued that the federal obscenity statute was 
impermissibly vague, and that under Bouie the new construction 
could not be applied to them. The Court disagreed. Years 
before, Roth had held the statute acceptable against a vagueness 
challenge. The enumeration in Miller, unlike the South Carolina 
court's action in Bouie, "did not purport to make criminal ... 
conduct which had not previously been thought criminal. That 
requirement instead added a 'clarifying gloss' to the prior 
construction and therefore made the meaning of the federal statute 
involved here 'more definite' in its application to federal 
obscenity prosecutions." 418 U.S., at 116. The petitioners 
in Hamling, the Court held, could not claim lack of fair notice. 
CA6 in the instant case quoted this passage from Hamling 
and jumped to the conclusion that Bouie did not apply to any 
particulars of Miller, since Miller did nothing but add a 
clarifying gloss. But that conclusion is erroneous. Hamling 
held that Miller's enumeration of specific sexual conduct 
did not expand the class of acts which would be considered 
; 
criminal, but, for the reasons discussed above> the same cannot 
reasonably be said of the third prong of the Miller test, shifting 
from "utterly without redeeming social value" to "lacks serious 
. value." That portion of Miller was more than gloss; it 
was an important change. 
10. 
The final sub-question here is exactly what should be the 
consequences of remand: should the matter go back to a new jury 
under Roth/Memoirs standards, or is it enough for the appellate 
5 
court to apply Roth/Memoirs itself? Both petitioners and the 
SG agree that it should go to the jury. This is a bit hard to ,___....__----
square with some of the things that happened in Hamling. Here 
we are talking about how to implement a transition-period 
11111" defendant's right to have the benefits of Memo ;~ s. In 
Hamling, the question was how to implement a similar defendant's 
right to the benefits of Miller. And in Hamling it was enough 
for the appellate court to apply Miller's benefits (namely, 
enumer ation of specific forbidden depictions, and local community 
standards). 
There is a certain symmetry to approving appellate applica-
tion here too. But I would resist the charms of symmetry in 
I 
this instance. There is evident in Hamling and Miller a certain 
reverence for jury determination with respect t~hree key tests: 
prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, and "serious" or 
"redeeming" value. (The reverence is akin to that for jury ; 
determination of reasonableness in negligence actions. 418 U.S., 
at 104.) These three are clearly the central elements in the 
offense under the federal statute, and the accused's right to 
trial by jury ought to extend this far. 
B. Must the appellate court view the materials? 
The second question need not detain the Court long. Miller 
emphasized that First AIµendment values derive important protection 
from "the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an 
11. 
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary." 
413 U.S. at 25. The Court has not apelled out just what circum-
stances make that independent review "necessary," but Jenkins 
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, has some hard-line language about 
not abandoning the "factual" determinations to the unbridled 
discretion of the jury. Id., at 160-61. Justice Brennan, 
joined by Stewart and Marshall, reads Jenkins as leaving no 
doubt that appellate courmmust always perform independent 
review. Id., at 163. Other Justices have occasionally voiced 
an equally strong view. See,~·&·, Manual Enterprises v. Day, 
370 U.S. 478, 488 (Harlan joined by Stewart); Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (Brennan joined by Goldberg). 
I am not sure why the Court was so coy in Jenkins - why 
it refrained from saying that appellate courts must, whenever 
asked, look at the films. It seems to me the court could say 
so now. The SG has come out squarely in support of this position. 
He is careful to note that this position does not impose a duty 
on this Court to take every case and view every pornographic 
movie. Review woul~ of course, remain discretionary as in any ~ 
other cert case. SG brief at 40-41. But the general duty of -
appellate courts would be clear. 
If the Court is not ready for such a pronouncement, a 
second option is available. The Court could hold that full 
independent appellate review was clearly "necessary" here, 
because CA6 arrogated to itself the task of deciding that the 
materials were obscene under a standard different from the one 
6 
the jury employed. CA6 was, in other words, making a basic f~ct"~l 
12. 
determination on its own, and there is no excuse for doing that 
without viewing the films. Since Roth it has been abundantly 
clear that materials are to be judged "as a whole." CA6 could 
not make such a judgment on the basis of the agent's affidavit, 
even though this agent was one thorough guy. From his minutely 
detailed description, one can undoubtedly tell that the films 
are raunchy. But one cannot be sure that such an account, 
~
compiled ex parte by an arm of the prosecution, is a fair 
rendering of the material. And obviously such an affidavit 
is not likely to capture the essence of whatever social value 
there may be. 
A final option is open. If the decision on the first issue ---- "'-
results in sending the case back to the jury, then it is not 
absolutely necessary to pass on the second question at all. 
Simply send it back to the district court and hope that CA6 
is more prudent next time. 
The SG, however, recommends a slightly different sequence. 
He evidently would like for this decision to make it clear that 
' the appellate court must view the materials. If that is the ~ ~ 
holding, he recommends remand to CA6 for a viewing first. 
If that court, applying Roth/Memoirs, determines that the 
materials are constitutionally protected, then acquittal is 
mandated. If it finds otherwise, then the case returns to the 
DC for a jury trial. SG brief at 40 n. 22. 
If you want to use this case to make clear the appellate 
court's duty to view, then the SG's proposed sequence should 
probably be followed. If for any reason you would prefer not 
13. 
to move beyond the strong hints evident in Jenkins (at least 
not in this case), then I would simply remand with instructions 
for a jury trial under Roth/Memoirs instructions. 
C. Which community's standards? 
The third issue is the only one on which the parties are at 
odds. The DC instructed that the jury was to apply the standards 
of the community comprising the judicial district, the Eastern 
District of Kentucky. He emphasized that the area extends to 
67 counties of Eastern Kentucky, and is not limited to the 
environs of Newport. The relevant instruction is quoted at 
length in the SG's brief, at 9 n. 6. 
Petitioners charge that this was error, since the jurors 
came from metropolitan Cincinnati and since half of them worked 
across the river in the city of Cincinnati itself. (The SG 
says there is no evidence of their workplaces in the record. 
SG brief at 42 n. 25). Moreover, it was in metropolitan 
Cincinnati that the films were shown. The instruction was 
prejudicial, petitioners say, because the judicial district 
embraces even remote rural areas of Appalachia, where standards~ 
are likely to be quite different, and the jurors could not 
really draw on their own experiences to know what the standards 
might be in distant regions. 
The SG argues that the DC anticipated Hamling, and that ·------after that case, instructions like those given here are clearly 
proper. Perhaps the standards of metropolitan Cincinnati were 
a set of standards that could have been applied, but they were 
not the only ones. Miller approved instructions based on the 
y 
14. 
entire state of California~ 1'£ the. Miller jurors could comprehend 
standards of such a large and diverse state, then the jurors 
here could properly apply district-wide standards. 
The petitioners, in my view, may well have the better 
argument as a matter of logic. They have hit on what seems to 
me one of the real weaknesses in the Miller approach. As a 
matter of logic, if national standards are not to be applied 
to prosecutions under federal statutes (and Hamling settled 
that), then the standards should be those of the community where 
the film is shown and where the people arguably Gffected (in 
the broadest sense) reside. Here that is almost surely 
metropolitan Cincinnati. If the material is not patently 
offensive tof hose who drive by the theatre or read the ads in 
the paper (those, in other words, who know Deep Throat is 
running in the area), then it is hard to justify suppressing 
it. It makes no difference if people a hundred miles away in 
that community is not 
-tW 
the Appalachian hills might be offended; 
really "affected." More importantly, to assu~e~the 67 counties 
of Eastern Kentucky comprise a "community" with intelligible 
standards is to indulge in an abstraction as meaningless as 
"national" standards. And national standards have come in for 
some rugged criticism from the Court on this basis. Miller, 
413 U.S., at 31-34; Hamling, 418 U.S., at 103-109. 
This problem suggests to me that Miller should perhaps 
7 
be rethought. I doubt that the Court is interested in doing 
~ 
so; this case, in any event, provides a poor vehicle. Assuming 
15. 
that Miller will be around a while, I feel certain that reversing 
on this point would be a mistake. And it would be inconsistent 
with the thrust of Hamling. 
If this Court reverses because the instructions should 
have focused on metropolitan Cincinnati, then every obscenity 
conviction is likely to go through numerous rounds of appeals 
and retrials before the instructions finally arrive at a 
definition of the appropriate community that will pass muster. 
And there are bound to be numerous cases where the "logical" 
answer is not as clear as here. Suppose the theatre had been 
20 miles outside of Newport, drawing a substantial audience from 
metro Cincinnati, but also a number of rural reprobates. At 
least two "communities" are involved. There is no totally 
adequate definition of community that can really apply in such 
a case. 
Hamling, in the face of these difficulties, settled for a 
pragmatic approach that probably renders acceptable nearly any 
,...--___-
formulation short of national standards. And even a national 
standards instruction is likely to be harmless error under the 
Hamling test, 418 U.S., at 108 - as it was in Hamling itself. 
; 
With the facts of the case as they were in Hamling, Hamling 
seems to border on cynicism about how seriously any jury is going 
to take instructions on community standards. It seems to say 
that even though the judge instructed them to apply national 
standards, what the jurors really did was to draw on their own 
experience from their own local district: 
Since this case was tried in the Southern District 
of California, and presumably jurors from throughout 
that judicial dis trict were avcialable to serve on the 
panel which tried getitioners, it would be the 
standards of that 'community" upon which the jurors 
would draw. 
418 U.S., at 105- 106. 
But whether that particular application was cynical or 
not - or correct or not - the basic perception in Hamling 
16. 
about the purpose and probable effect of community standards 
instructions is surely accurate. Such instructions convey to the 
jury that material is not to be judged "on the basis of each 
juror's personal opinion, nor by its effect on a particularly 
sensitive or insensitive person or group." 418 U.S., at 107. 
Practically any instructions which state that community - rather 
than individual - standards are to be applied will produce this 
effect. If that is all that is hoped for from community standards 
instructions, then there is no point in encouraging protracted 
wrangles and intricate appellate review over the exact contours 
of a "community." It would not hurt if district courts could 
be sure a community standard instruction based on the judicial , 
district will survive appellate review. Whatever anomalies 
persist (since most judicial districts do not in a functional 
sense constitute a community) will simply have to be tolerated. 
Here the jurors received instructions which accomplish 
the basic purpose Hamling identified. Moreover, petitioners 
were permitted to introduce expert testimony that was based on 
Cincinnati's community standards, apparently invoking their 
right under Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 121. Unless 
17. 
Miller is to be rethought, the community standards instructions 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The following cases have reversed convictions based 
on pre-Miller conduct where the DC instructed under Miller; 
U.S. v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012 (GAS 1974); U.S. v. Jacobs, 
513 F.2d 564 (CA9 1974); U.S. v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361 
(CADC 1975). 
Two earlier cases are also important: U.S. v. Thevis, 484 
F.2d 1149 (GAS 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 932; U.S. v. 
Palladino, 490 F.2d 499 (CA 1 1974). In both of these, both 
conduct and trial occurred before Miller, and the instructions 
1'.a.. CA4 k.t.l.t -tt-..t 
derived from Memoirs. AMiller did not void all Memoirs-based 
convictions, but that on appellate review, appellants were 
entitled to all the benefits of either test. U.S. v. Line t sky, 
533 F.2d 192 (GAS 1976), and U.S. v. Thevis,~ F.2d ~ (GAS 
1976), cert. pending, No. 75-1600, decided after the instant 
case, are to the same effect. 
U.S. v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733 (GAS 1974) should also be 
noted. The trial court give an instruction that seemed based 
on Miller, but GAS found, on reviewing the instructions as a 
whole, that they really conveyed the "utterly without redeeming 
social value" standard to the jury. Thus the court did not 
feel itself obliged to decide whether Miller instructions for 
pre-Miller conduct would have been error. 
U.S. v. Friedman, 528 F.2d 784 (CAlO 1976), decided after 
the instant case, apparently represents the only other circuit 
that agrees with CA6. Cert is pending (No. 75-1663), and 
N-2 
Charlie's cert memo indicates that that case, despite a few 
wrinkles this one does not have, should meet the same fate 
as this. 
2. The Bouie court did not emphasize this factor as much 
as it did the other two. In fact, the word "indefensible" comes 
in only as part of a quote from Hall, General Principles of 
Criminal Law. 378 U.S. at 354. But it was precisely this L 1 
~~ -ti..A. ~""'T'.,......- CA,< 
factor and this language upon which the District Court relied" 
in order to distinguish Bouie. Joint Appendix at A49. 
3. It may be, in the end, that judicial constructions 
. 1 . O..~'/ b . h ld b 1 · d · 1 invo vingAsu Ject matters ou not e app ie retroactive y 
if they are even minimally detrimental to defendants. But Bouie 
did not hold that, and this case does not necessitate going so 
far. I'd prefer to think about that proposition a while. 
4. Some judges, including both courts belo~ have expressed 
difficulty in understanding why Miller itself was remanded 
unless the holding of Miller was intended to apply with full 
retroactivity. App. to Petn at Al4; JA at A49; United States ~ 
v. Palladino, supra note 1 at 504 (Aldrich, J., dissenting). 
But remand makes good sense without full retroactivity if, as 
Hamling held, all Miller benefits must be applied even to 
defendants who transgressed before June of 1973. A careful 
reading of the remand instructions in Miller, 413 U.S., at 37, 
strongly suggests anyway that remand was limited to applying 
benefits. The instructions refer explicitly to the footnote 
in U.S. v. 12 200-ft Reels of Film where this Court telegraphs 
N-3 
its intention to construe the federal statute as applying only 
to the specific depictions listed in Miller at 25. This 
specificity requirement is foremost among the "benefits" of 
Miller. 
5. CA6, of course, did purport to apply Roth/Memoirs 
at the appellate level already. But it did so without seeing 
the films. As explained in more detail below, I see no way 
that its action can be considered adequate appellate review in 
circumstances like these. 
6. The SG attaches only one minor qualification, and 
it relates to an unusual set of facts in a case pending here 
(No. 75-985), held for Marks: U.S. v. American Theatre Corp., 
526 F.2d 48 (CA8 1975). There defendants stipulated in the 
DC to the contents of the films, apparently in order to keep 
the jury from seeing them. On appeal they contended that the 
CA had to view the films themselves. The SG argues that a 
defendant whose pursues such a litigating strategy in the DC is 
stuck with the stipulation in the CA. Whichever way American 
Theatre comes out, it can be no more than a minor limitation ~ 
on any rule requiring appellate court viewing at the instance 
of the defendant. 
7. [A personal note]. This community standards problem 
is only one part of a larger vagueness problem that leaves me 
uneasy about Miller. Before working on this memo, I had never 
taken the time to reflect much on obscenity case law. I find 
myself persuaded by much of what Justice Brennan says in Paris 
Adult Theatres. If obscenity could be readily distinguished 
N-4 
from protected speech, then I would not be greatly troubled 
by efforts to suppress it. But it is no secret that the formula-
tions are imprecise, and have been the subject of much struggle 
on the part of courts for years. Even under the rigid Memoirs 
standards, we still have juries and courts permitting a film 
an innocuous as Carnal Knowledge to be suppressed - until this 
Court steps in as it did in Jenkins. And all this imprecision 
is tolerated despite the presence of two factors which should 
counsel otherwise: the statutes regulate expression, and the 
sanction is a criminal one, possibly entailing years in jail. 
The fact of criminal sancations despite imprecise standards 
is perhaps the most distressing feature. I would have much less 
trouble with abatement actions of some sort, or laws confining 
dirty movies and adult book stores to certain limited areas of 
town, in line with Young v. American Mini Theatres. 
In any event, I have not pursued these thoughts to the 
point of any great coherence, because I don't sense any meaning-
ful possibility that Miller will be overruled - certainly not 
using this case as a vehicle. But I hope some day we have the ~ 
leisure to talk generally about this subject. 
v,,, f kJ (, II- (, 
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DATE: December 13, 1976 
I have only one substantive question about the 
draft of the .P...:£.:. for the Court. 
On page 7, the draft states that Miller brought 
about a "judicial enlargement of a criminal statute" 
analogous to that addressed in Bouie. The SG's brief, 
however, takes a different view. It observes (pp. 20, 21) 
that S 1465, under which petrs were charged, "is sweeping". 
It prohibits all transportation i~ commerce of obscenity 
defined broadly and generally. As the SG put it: 
''Miller announced a constitutional standard 
that limited the reach of any statute to a 
constitutionally defined group of 'obscene' 
materials." 
The SG goes on to say that Bouie and Rabe involve -
cases of judicial expanlion of statutory language. But 
''Miller did not expand the scope of a statute, but rather 
restricted it". The prior cases {Roth, Memoirs) also had 
restricted the application of obscenity statutes by 
applying constitutional limitations. Miller changed the 
2. 
constitutional rule. (SG's brief pp. 21, 22). 
The SG's analysis seems to me to be more precise, 
although it ends up where you do in the draft. Putting 
it simply, the effect of~ was to narrow the reach 
of the federal statute; Memoirs further circumscribed 
its reach; and Miller, repudiating Memoirs and amplifying 
Roth, enlarged or broadened the ambit of the statute's .......... 
prohibition. These gyrations were achieved, not by 
interpreting the statute (as in Bouie), but by defining 
the constitutional standard permissible in the application 
of obscenity statutes. 
Unless there is some flaw in this line of analysis, 
I suggest that you make appropriate revisions in the draft. 
Otherwise, I think we have a fine draft and excellent 
footnotes. I would be happy to have this go out over my 
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I have only one substantive question about the 
draft of the .I?..!£.:.. for the Court. 
On page 7, the draft states that Miller brought 
about a "judicial enlargement of a criminal statute" 
analogous to that addressed in Bouie. The SG's brief, 
however, takes a different view. It observes (pp. 20, 21) 
that§ 1465, under which petrs were charged, "is sweeping". 
It prohibits all transportation in conunerce of obscenity 
defined broadly and generally. As the SG put it: 
"Miller announced a constitutional standard 
that limited the reach of any statute to a 
constitutionally defined group of 'obscene' 
materials." 
The SG goes on to say that Bouie and Rabe involve 
cases of judicial expansion of statutory language. But 
''Miller did not expand the scope of a statute, but rather 
restricted it". The prior cases (Roth, Memoirs) also had 
restricted the application of obscenity statutes by 
applying constitutional limitations. Miller changed the 
I 
constitutional rule . (SG's brief pp. 21, 22). 
The SG's analysis seems to me to be more precise, 
although it ends up where you do in the draft. Putting 
it simply, the effect of Roth was to narrow the reach 
of the federal statute; Memoirs further circumscribed 
its reach; and Miller, repudiating Memoirs and amplifying 
Roth, enlarged or broadened the ambit of the statute's 
prohibition. These gyrations were achieved, not by 
interpreting the statute (as in Bouie), but by defining 
the constitutional standard permissible in the application 
of obscenity statutes. 
2. 
Unless there is some flaw in this line of analysis, 
I suggest that you make appropriate revisions in the draft. 
Otherwise, I think we have a fine draft and excellent 
footnotes . I would be happy to have this go out over my 
name rather than a .E..:..£.:.., but I suppose we are limited by 
our assignment. 
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Stanley Marks et al., Petitioners] On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the United States Court 
U ·+~ :I St t , of Appeals for the Sixth 11111'::c ... a es. (Y ·t 
, IrCUl • 
[January - , 1977] 
PER CURlAM. 
This case presents the question, not fully answered in 
Hamling v United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1971), whether the 
standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 
(1973), are to be applied retroactively to the potential detri~ 
ment of a defendant in a criminal case. We granted certio-
rari, 424 U. S. 942 (1976), to resolve' a conflict in the 
circuits/ 
1 Two Courts of App('al,, have found instrnctions dE'rived from Miller 
appropriate m pro;,ecutions bnsed 011 conduct occurrmg before the Miller 
decision came down: United .States v. Marks, 520 F. 2d 913 (CA6 1975) 
(the in8tant CME') ; nnd United States v. Friedman, 528 F . 2d 784 (CAIO 
1976), p<:'tition for CE'rt. prnding, No. 75-H\B3. Thr('<:' Ca11rtR of Appeahs 
have rrv<:'r;;Nl eonvict1ons wher<:' Miller instmctions were given by the 
District Court : United States v. Wasserman , 504 F . 2d 1012 (CA5 1974) ; 
United States v. Jacobs . 513 F 2d 564 (CA9 1974) ; United States v. 
Sherpix. Inc , 168 U. S. App. D . C . 121 , 512 F . 2d 1361 (1975) . 
In two earher ca:-;~ both conduct. and trial occnrrrd prior to Miller, 
and th<:' Jury mstructiom; werf' drrived from Memoirs v Massach'U,/Jetts , 
as3 U. S. 413 (1966) (plmality opinion) . United States v. Thevi 
(Thevis 1) , 484 F . 2d 1149 (CA5 1973), cert denird , 418 U. S. 932 
(1974) ; United States "· Palladino, 490 F . 2d 499 (CAI 1974) . The 
Courts of Appral~ ther<:'. fore:,ha.dowmg to some extent our later decision 
in Hamling v. United .States, supra, held that, Miller did not void all 
Memoirs-based conviction;.;, but that on revif'w , appellant , were f'ntitled 
to all the brnefit;.; of both t }1~ Miller 1111\{ M ernoirs Rtandardi,; Seo 
9 
'i'5-'i'08-PER CUfUAM 
MARKS v. UNITED STATES 
I 
Petitioners were charged with several counts of transport,.., 
ing obscene materials in interstate commerce, in violation of 
18 U. S. C. § 1465, · and with conspiracy to transport such 
materials, 18 U. S. C. §'371. The conduct that gave rise to 
the charges covered a period through February 27, 1973, 
Trial did not begin until the following October. In the in-. 
terim. on June 21, 1973, this Court decided Miller v. Cali-
fornia., supra, and its companion cases.2 Miller announced 
new standards for "isolat[ing] 'hard core' pornography from 
expression protected by the First Amendment." 413 U. S.1 
at 29.a That these new stanqards would also guide the 
Hamling, 418 U. S., at 102. In late>r case:; presenting similar facts, the 
Fifth Circuit ha,,: a.pplied its holding in Thevi8 I. See, e. g., United 
States v. Linetsk.11, 533 F . 2d 192 (CA5 1976); United States v. Thevis 
(Thevis II) , 526 F. 2d 989 (CA5 1976), petition for cert. pending, No. 
75-1600. See also United States v. Hill, 500 F. 2d 733 (CA5 1974), cert . 
denied, 420 l l. S. 952 (1975). And the Ninth Circuit, following Hamling, 
has re>ached t.he ,mrne result . United States v. Cutting; 538 F. 2d 835 
(CA9 1976) (en bane). 
2 Paris Adult Theatre I \. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 (1973) ; Kaplan v, 
California, 413 U. S. 115 (197:3); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of' 
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) ; United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973), 
a Miller held : 
"The bu.sic guidelines for the trier of fact. must be: (a) whether 'tho 
average per:son, applying contemporary community standards' would find, 
· that tlw work, take>n as a whole, appeals to the prnrient interest ... ; 
(b ) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct spe>cifically defined by the applicable state Jaw; ancl 
(c) whether the work. U1km as :1 whole, larh serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value." 413 U. S., at. 24. 
Under part (b) of the test. it is adequate 1f the statute, as written or· 
as judicially corutrued. specifically defines the sexual conduct, depiction 
of wlmh is forbidden . The Court in Miller offered examples of wh9t 
1:1, State might constitutionally choose to regulate : 
"(9) Patently offensive representations or de;;criptiorn; of ultimate. 
eexual acts, normal or perverted, actqal or simulated. 
~' (b) Patentlr offenHive :rcpre::;entat.ion:- OJ' de:-;cnptions of masturbation, 
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future interpretation of the fe<lera] obscenity laws was clear 
from United States v. 12 200-foot Reels of Filrn, 413 U. 8. 
123. 129-130, and n. 7 (H'J73), decided the same day as Miller. 
See Harnh:ng v. United States, 418 U. S., at 105, 113-114. 
Petitioners argued in the District Court that they were 
entitled to jury instructiqns not under Miller, but under the 
more favorable formulation of M enwirs v. Massachusetts , 
383 U. 8. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).4 Memoirs, i11 their-
view, authoritatively stated the law in effect prior to Miller, 
by which petitioners charted their course of conduct. They 
focused in particular on the third pa:rt of the M ernoirs test. 
Under it, expressive material is constitutionally protede<l 
unless it JS "utterly without redeeming social value.'' 383 
U. 8., at 418. Cnder Miller the comparable test is "whether 
the work, taken as a w11ole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political. or scientific value." 413 U. S., at 24. Miller, 
petitioners argue. casts a significantly wider net than 
Memoirs . To apply Miller retroactively, and thereby punish 
conduct innocent under Memoirs, violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment-much as retroactive apph-
catiou of a new statute to penalize conduct innocent when 
performed would violate the Constitution's ban on ex post 
facto laws, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., § 10, cl. 1. The District 
Court overruled these objections and instructed the jury 
t•xrrPtorr f1m<'tion:-, nml lt'Wd exh1h1t1on of 1htl g<>uitals." 4m U. S, 
HI, 25. 
'The pluralit) i11 }le mom, he!J that •'1hrec Pk·ml'nts nuts1 coalesce" 
ir matrnal is to hp found ol.>:-rPllf' and therefor£> otttside the protect1011 of 
the First Am(•nc1mrn1.: 
'·it must b1' l'Hta1.>h:,'hpd t'lw1 (u) till· dominant themt• of the materia1 
taken a~ ;1 wholt- appl'a.J~ to a prurwnt mtl-1·rst in Hex, (b) the matE>ria1 
fa pi~tently o!frmavr• 'beca 118P 11 affront;, coutrmporary community stand-
ards rclntmg 1o the <lt::i<'l'l))tJon or l'<'T>I'l'::i< 'ntation of ::;exual ma.ttcrs; and. 
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under the Miller standards. Petitioners were convicted/' and 
11 divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
520 F. 2d 913 (1975). We now reverse. 
II 
['he Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers 
of the legislature, see Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 (1798), and 
does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of 
governme11t. Frank v. Ma;ngum, 237 U. S., 309, 344 (1915). 
But the principle on which the cla.use is based-the notion 
that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct 
which will give rise to criminal penalties-is fundamental to 
our concept of constitutional liberty. See United States v. 
Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939) . As such, that right is protected 
against judicial action by the Due Process Cl~use of the 
Fifth Amendment. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 
347 (1964), a case involving the cognate provision of the 
Fourtee11th Amendment, we reversed trespass convictions, 
finding that they rested on an unexpected construction of the 
state trespass statute by the State Supreme Court. We 
held: 
"[A] n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal 
statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an 
ex post facto law such as Art. I, § 10, of the Coustitu .. 
tion forbids. . . . If a state legislature is barred by 
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it 
must follow that a State Supreme Court is b3rrred by the 
Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same 
result by judicial construction." Id., at 353-354. 
Similarly, in Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313 (1972), 
we reversed a conviction under a state obscenity law because 
5 Petitioner American News Co., Inc., was convicted only on the con-
spiracy charge. The other four petitioners were convicted of 'conspiracy 
{UH~ also on St'ven of the eight suh;,tantive rounts. 
'· 
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it rested on an unforeseeable judicial constrtlction of the 
statute. We stressed that reversal was mandated because 
affected citizens lacked fair notice that the statute would 
be thus applied. 
Relying on Bouie, petitioners assert that Miller and its 
companion cases unforeseeably expanded the reach of the 
federal obscenity statutes beyond what was punishable under 
Memoirs. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It 
noted-correctly-that the Memoirs standards never com-
rna11ded the assent of more than three Justices at any one 
time, and it apparently concluded from this fact that 
M ernoirs never became the law. By this line of reasoning, 
one must judge whether Miller expanded criminal liability 
by looking not to Memoirs, but to Roth v. United States, 354 
U. S. 476 (1957), the last comparable plenary decision of this 
Court prior to Miller in which a majority united in a single 
opinion announcing the rationale behind the Court's holding.0 
Although certain language in Roth formed the basis for the 
plurality's formulation in Memoirs, Roth's test for qistin-
guishing obscenity from protected speech was a fairly simple 
one to articulate: "whether to the average person, applying 
contemporary commuuity standards, the dominant theme of 
the material taken as a whole appeals to the · prurient in-
terest." Id., at 489. If indeed Roth, not Memoirs, stated 
the applicable law prior to Miller, there would be much to 
commend the apparent view of the Court of Appeals that 
Miller did not significantly change the law. 
But we think the basic premise for this line of reasoning 
is faulty. When a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explainiug the result enjoys the assent of 
6 Shortly after M emoir8, in re;;ponse to the divergence of opinion 11mong 
Members of the Court , we began the pral'tice of disposing 'of obscenity 
cases · in brief per wriarn deciilion,,;. Redr-up v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 
(1967) , was the first. At lea<i1 31 cases were: dPc1ded in this fashion , 
They are collected iu Paris Adult Theatre 1 ¥ . Slaton, 418 U. S. 49, 82-83, 
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five justices. "the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds ... . . " Gregg v. Georgia., 
- U.S.-, - n. 15 (1976) (opinion of STEWART, PowELL, 
and STEVENS, JJ.) . Three Justices joined in the controlling 
opi11io11 in Memoirs. Two others, Mr. Justice Black ~nd 
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred on broader grounds in revers-
ing the judgment below. 383 U. S., at 421, 424. They re-
iterated their well-known position that the First Amendment 
provides an absolute shield a.gainst governmental action aimed 
at suppressing obscenity. ~R. JUSTICE STEWART also con-
curred in the judgment, based on his view that only "hard-
core pornography" may be suppressed. Id., at 421. See 
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 499 (1966) 
(STEWART, J .. dissE>nting). The view of the Memoirs plural-
ity therefore constituted the holding of the Court and pro-
vided the governing standards. Indeed, every Court of Ap-
peals that considered the question between M ~moirs and 
]v.'1:Uer so read our decisions.7 Materials were deemed to 
be constitutionally protected unles.s the prosecution carried 
the burden of proving that they were "utterly without re-
deeming social value,'' and otherwise satisfied the stringent 
Memoirs requirements. 
Memoirs therefore was the · law. Miller did not simply 
clarify Roth; it marked a significitnt departure from Memoirs. 
And there can be little doubt that the third te,i:;t annouuce<l 
in Miller-whether the work "lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value''-expanded criminal liability, 
The Court in Miller expressly observed that the "utterly 
without redeeming social value'' test places on the prosecutor 
"a burden Vll'tually impossible to discharge under our criminal 
standards of proof .. ' 413 U. H. . at 422. Clearly jt was 
·, Sc'l>, e. g., Hook& , Inc I l nited 8tate& , ;35~ F 2d 9:35 (CAl 19tl6), 
1·ev'd per cunam, :388 U. S 44\.l ( 196T) ; Vnited States v. 35 mm, 
Motion Pict-ur(' Film, 432 ~'. 2d 705 (CA2 ]970) , cert. dismissed sub nom, 
'· 
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thought that some conduct which would have gone un-
punished under Memoirs would result in convictio11 under 
Miller. 
This case is not strictly analogous to .{3ouie. The statu-
tory language there was "narrow and precise,'' 378 U. S., at 
352, and that fact was important to our · holdiug tha.t the 
expansive construction adopted by the State Supreme Court 
deprived the accused of fair wamir,g, In contrast, the statute 
involved here always has used sweeping language to describe 
that which is forbidden .~ But precisely because the statute 
is sweeping, its reach necessarily has been confined within 
the constitutional limits annou11ced by this Court. Memoirs 
severely restricted its applicatiou. li1iller also restricts its 
application beyond what the language might indicate. but 
Miller undeniably relaxes the Memoirs restrictions. The 
effect is the same as the new construction in Bouie. Peti-
United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc ., 403 U. S. 925 (1971) ; United 
States v. 1'eu Erotic Paintings. 432 F. 2d 420 (CA4 1970); United States 
v. Groner, 479 F . 2d 577 (CA5 1973) (en bane) (the 7 dissenting Judge::f 
and one judge concurring in the m;ult-constituting a majority on this 
issue-found that. Memoirs st~ted the governing standard), vacated and 
remanded for further con:sidt>ration in light of Miller, 414 U. S. 960 
(1973); United States v. Pellegrino, 467 F . 2d 41 (CA9 1972); South-
eastern Promotions Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CAlO 1972) ; 
Huffman v. United States, 152 U. S. App. D . C 238, 470 F . 2d 386 
(1971), conviction reversed on otlwr grounds upon rehearing after Miller, 
163 U S App. D. C 417, 502 F . 2d 419 (1974) Cf. Grove Press, Inc , 
v. City uf Philadelphia, 418 F. 2d 82 (CAa 19fi9) ; Cinecom '/'heaters 
Midwest States, Inc . v City of Fort lVayne , 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 19.7:3); 
Luros v. United States, 389 F. 2d 200 (CA~ 1968) . 
'Thr ,;ta tut<' prov1dc•s 111 pertm<'nt part · 
"Whoever knowingly traru;ports in mten;tate or foreign commerce for 
tho purpo8e of ,ml<' or distnbution any ob~c<>ne, lewd , lasr1vious, or filthy 
book, pamphlet . pictmc, film . paper, letter, writing, print, 8ilhouette, 
drawing, figurr. 1mnge, ca~{., phon~grnph n•oording , electnral tr:rn::icription 
or other n.rticlt> capable of prod11rmg sound or nny other matter of indeT 
,rent. or immoral chamct<•r, ,;hall be fined not more than $5,000 or impris-
,Qncq. not morr tlmn five yean-, or both/' 1~ U 8 C. § 1465. 
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tio11ers, engaged in the business of marketing dicey films, had 
no fair warning that their products might be subjected to the 
new standards.u 
We h1we taken special care to insist on fair warning when 
a statute reguhites expression and implicates First Amend-
ment values. See, e. g., Buckley v. "Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 40-41 
(1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573 (1974). Sec-
tion 1465 is such a statute. We therefore hold, in accord-
ance with Bo'U,ie, that the Due Process Clause precludes the 
application to ~titioners of the standards announced in 
Miller v. California, to the extent that those standards may 
impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under 
Memoirs. Specifically, petitioner~ are entitled to jury in-
0 In Hamling we rejrcted a challenge batSed on Bouie v. City of Co-
lumbia, supra, superficially i,irnilar to the challenge that is sustained here. 
418 U. S., at 115-q6. But the similarity is superficial only. There the 
petitioners foct1secl o:Q part. (b) of the Miller test. They argued that 
their convictions coulq not stand because Miller requires that the cate-
gories of material punishable under the statute must be specifically 
enumerated in the statute or in authoritative ,judicial construction . No 
such limiting construction had been announced at the time they engaged 
in the conduct that led to their convictions. We held that this made 
out no claim under B01ifo, for part (b) did not expand the reach of the 
statute. "[TJhe enumeration of specific categories of material in Miller 
which might be found obscene did not, purport to make criminal, for the 
purpose of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, conduct which had not previorn,ly been 
thought criminal." 418 U. S., a.I 116. 
For the reasons noted i11 text, tlw same cannot be said of part (c) of 
the Miller test, shifting from "utterly without redeeming :;ocial value"· 
to "lacks serious litrrary. arfa11c, political or scientific value.'' This was 
implicitly recognized by t.he Court in Harnling itself. There the trial 
took place before Miller , a.ud the jurr had been instructed in accordance 
with Memoirs . H~ verdiet 1wcf,:,;sanly meaut that tt found the materials 
to be utterly without redrmnng soriql valtw. This Court. examined the 
record and drtt>rminect that the jury\ verdict "was supported by the· 
evidence and eom,i:,;tent with the Memoirs formulation of obscenity." 
418 U . S., at 100. We did not avoid that inquiry on the grounds that 
Me;noirs h:ul no rrlevanev, a,,, we might have done if Miller 11.pplied, 
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structions requiring the jury to acquit unless it finds that the 
materials involved are "utterly without redeeming social 
val4e." 10 At the same time we reaffirm our holding in 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 102, that "any con-
stitutional princtple enunciated in Miller which would serve 
to qenefit petitioners must be applied in their case." ll 
Reversed and remanded.12 
10 The Court of Appea1s stated, apparently ·without viewing the mate-
rials themselves, 520 F. 2d, at 9;32 n. 1 (McCree, J., cjissenting), t.lrnt in 
its view the materials here were obscene tinder either 1v! emoirs or Miller. 
520 F. 2q, at 92i. Such 11, conclusiqn, abr.ent other dependablP mPans of 
knO\ying U1e character of t-he materials, is of dt1bious value. But ~ven 
if we accept the court's conclusion, unlfer these circumstances it. is not 
an adequitte substih1te for the c!f)cision Ill the ~rist, inst~nce of a. properl;r 
instn1cted jury, as to this inwort11nt ~lemer1t of the offense under 18 
U. S. C. § 1465. i ' ' 
11 The Court of Appeals 11,ppa1·~ntly t:hopgl1t thitt our remand in Miller 
and the companion cases necessarily m~nt tl1at, Miller standards were 
fully retroa.ctive. 520 lf. 2d, a.t 920. -~t'Jt ·tl}e passage from Hamling 
quoted in the text, which 8impl~1 re11{firml:i ti principle implicit in Miller, 
makes it clear t.hat t.he remands carried no littrh implicfltion . Our 1973 
cases were remanded for the · court::; belcny tQ apply the "benefits" of 
Miller. See n. 3, s7,ipra. 
12 In view of our disposition of the ca:,;e, we have no occasion to reach 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA.TES 
No. 75-708 
Stanley Marks ct al., Petitioners) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the United States Court 
U ·t d ct t "' of Apprals for the Sixth Ill C ,"J a .e,,. C' ·t 
ffCUl . 
[January -, 1977] 
PER CURIAM. 
This case presents the question, not fully answered in 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), whether the 
standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 
( 1973), are to be applied retroactively to the potential detri-
ment of a defendant in a criminal case. We granted certio-
rari, 424 U. S. 942 (1976), to resolve a conflict in the 
circuits.1 
1 Two Courts of Appeals have found instructions derived from Miller 
appropriate in prosecutions based on conduct occurring before the Miller 
deci:;ion came down: United States v. Marks, 520 F. 2d 913 (CA6 1975) 
(the instant case); and United States v. Friedman, 528 F. 2d 784 (CAlO 
1976), petition for cert. pending, No. 75-1663. Three Courts of Appeals 
ha, o reversed convictions where Miller instructions were given by the 
District Court: United States v. Wasserman, 504 F. 2d 1012 (CA5 1974); 
United States v. Jacobs, 513 F. 2d 564 (CA9 1974); United States v. 
Sherpix, Inc., 168 U. S. App. D. C. 121, 512 F. 2d 1361 (1975). 
In two earlier cases both conduct and trial occurred prior to Miller, 
and the jury instrurtions were derived from Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 
383 U. S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion). United States v. Thevis 
(Thevis I), 484 F. 2d 1149 (CA5 1973), cert deuied, 418 U. S. 932 
(1974); United States v. Palladino, 490 F. 2d 499 (CAI 1974). The 
Courts of Appeals there, foreshadowing to some extent our later decision 
in JI amling v. United States, supra, held that Miller did not Yoid all 
Memoirs-based convictions, but that on review appellants were entitled 
to all the benefits of both the Miller and Memoirs standnrds. See 
2 
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Petitioners were charged with several counts of transport-
ing obscene materials in interstate commerce, in violation of 
18 U. S. C. § 1465, and with conspiracy to transport such 
materials, 18 U. S. C. § 371. The conduct that gave rise to 
the charges covered a period through February 27, 1973. 
Trial did not begin until the following October. In the in-
terim, on June 21, ·1973, this Court decided Miller v. Cali-
fornia, supra, and its companion cases. 2 Miller announced 
new standa.rds for "isolat[ing] 'hard core' pornography from 
expression protected by the First Amendment." 413 U. S., 
at 29.3 That these new standards would also guide the 
IIamling, 418 U. S., at 102. In later casrs presrnting similar facts , the 
Fifth Circuit hns applied its holding in Thevis I. See, e. g., Unit('d 
States v. Lin('tsky, 533 F. 2d Hl2 (CA5 1976); United States v. Thevis 
(Thevis fl), 526 F. 2d 989 (CA5 1976), petition for cert. pending, No. 
75-1600. Sec nlso Unit ed States v. Hill, 500 F. 2d 733 (CA5 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975). And the Ninth Circuit, following Hamling, 
has reached the same result. United States v. Cutting, 538 F. 2d 835 
(CA!.) 1976) (en b:rnc). 
2 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. 
California, 413 U. S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of 
Film, 413 U. S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U. S. 139 (1973). 
3 Miller held: 
"The basic guidelines for the trier of fart must be: (a) whether 'lhe 
average person, applying contemporary rommunity standards' would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . ; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether Lhc work, taken as fl whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value." 413 U. S., at 24. 
Under part ( b) of Lhe test, it is adequ:itc if the statute, as written or 
as judicially construed, specifically definrs the sexual conduct, depiction 
of which is forbidden. The Cou1t in Mi/l('r offered examples of what 
a State might constitutionally choose to regulate: 
"(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate 
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. 
"(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, 
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future interpretation of the federal obscenity laws was clear 
from United States v. 12 200-foot Reels of Filrn, 413 U. S. 
123, 129-130, and n. 7 (1973), decided the same day as Miller. 
See Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 105, 113-114. 
Petitioners argued in the District Court that they were 
entitled to jury instructions not under Miller, but under the 
more favorable formulation of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 413 (1066) (plurality opinion).• Memoirs, in their 
view, authoritatively stated the law in effect prior to Miller, 
by which petitioners charted their course of conduct. They 
focused in particular on the third part of the M ernoirs test. 
Under it, expressive material is constitutionally protected 
unless it is "utterly without redeeming social value." 383 
U. S., at 418. Under Miller the comparable test is "whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value." 413 U. S., a.t 24. M1:ller, 
petitioners a.rgue, casts a significantly wider net than 
Memoirs. To apply Miller retroactively, and thereby punish 
conduct innocent under M enioirs, violates the Due Process 
Cla.use of the Fifth Amendment-much as retroactive appli-
cation of a new statute to penalize conduct innocent when 
performed would violate tne Constitution's ban on ex post 
facto laws, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., ~ 10, cl. 1. The District 
Court overruled these objections and instructed the jury 
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U. S., 
at 25. 
4 The plurality in Memoirs held that "three elements must coalesce" 
if material is to be found obscene and therefore outside the protection of 
the First Amendment: 
"it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material 
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (h) 1,he material 
is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community stand-
ard,; relating to the description or representation of sexual matter.,; and 
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under the Miller standards. Petitioners were convicted,5 and 
a divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
520 F. 2d 913 (1975). We now reverse. 
II 
The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers 
of the legislature, see Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 (1798), and 
docs not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of 
government. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S., 309, 344 (1915). 
But the principle on which the clause is based-the notion 
that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct 
which will give rise to criminal penalties-is fundamental to 
our concept of constitutional liberty. See United States v. 
Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). As such, that right is protected 
against judicial action by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 
347 (1964), a case involving the cognate provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reversed trespass convic-
tions, finding that they rested on an unexpected construction 
of the state trespass statute by the State Supreme Court: 
"[A]n unforeseeable judicia1 enlargement of a criminal 
statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an 
ex post facto law such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitu-
tion forbids. . . . If a state legislature is barred by 
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it 
must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the 
Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same 
result by judicial construction." Id., at 353-354. 
Similarly, in Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313 (1972), 
we reversed a conviction under a state obscenity law because 
5 Petitioner American News Co., Inc., was com·icted only on the con-
SJ>iracy charge. The other four petitioners were convicted of conspiracy 
and nlso on seven of the eight substantive counts. 
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it rested on an unforeseeable judicial construction of the 
statute. We stressed that reversal was mandated because 
affected citizens lacked fair notice that the statute would 
be thus applied. 
Relying on Bouie, petitioners assert that Miller and its 
companion cases unforeseeably expanded the reach of the 
federal obscenity statutes beyond what was punishable under 
Memoirs. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It 
noted- correctly-that the M emoirs standards never com-
manded the assent of more than three Justices at any one 
time, and it apparently concluded from this fact that 
Memoirs never became the law. By this line of reasoning, 
one must judge whether Miller expanded criminal liability 
by looking not to Memoirs, but to Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476 (1957), the last comparable plenary decision of this 
Court prior to Miller in which a majority united in a single 
opinion announcing the rationale behind the Court's holding.6 
Although certain language in Roth formed the basis for the 
plurality's formulation in M emoirs, Roth's test for distin-
guishing obscenity from protected speech was a fairly simple 
one to articulate: "whether to the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of 
the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient in-
terest." Id., at 489. If indeed Roth, not M emoirs, stated 
the applicable law prior to M iller, there would be much to 
commend the apparent view of the Court of Appeals that 
Miller did not significantly change the law. 
But we think the basic premise for this line of reasoning 
is faulty. When a fragmC'nted Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
6 Shortly after III emoirs, in response to the divergence of opinion among 
Mcmbcr5 of the Court, the Court bepn the prn r ti rc of di~po~ing of obii c:cn-
ity caw's in brief per ruriam dceigionii . R edrup Y. N ew Yo rk, 386 U. S. 
767 (1967), was the first. At least 31 cnscs were dcr'iclrd in th i,-; fo~h ion. 
They arc collected in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 , 82-83, 
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five justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds .... " Gregg v. Georgia, 
- U.S.-, - n. 15 (1976) (opinion of STEWART, POWELL, 
and STEVENS, JJ.). Three Justices joined in the controlling 
opinion in Memoirs. Two others, Mr. Justice Black and 
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred on broader grounds in revers-
ing the judgment below. 383 U. S., at 421, 424. They re-
iterated their well-known position that the First Amendment 
provides an absolute shield against governmental action aimed 
at suppressing obscenity. MR. JUSTICE STEWART also con-
curred in the judgment, based on his view that only "hard-
core pornography" may be suppressed. Id., at 421. See 
Girzzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 499 (1966) 
(STEWART, J., dissenting). The view of the Memoirs plural-
ity therefore constituted the holding of the Court and pro-
vided the governing standards. Indeed, every Court of Ap-
peals that considered the question between Memoirs and 
Miller so read our decisions.7 Materials were deemed to 
be constitutionally protected unless the prosecution carried 
the burden of proving that they were "utterly without re-
deeming social value," and otherwise satisfied the stringent 
Memoirs requirements. 
Memoirs therefore was the law. Miller did not simply 
clarify Roth; it marked a significant departure from M enioirs. 
And there can be little doubt that the third test announced 
in Miller-whether the work "lacks serious litera.ry, artistic, 
political, or scientific value"-expanded criminal liability. 
The Court in Miller expressly observed that the "utterly 
without redeeming social value" test places on the prosecutor 
"n, burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal 
standards of proof." 413 U. S., at 22. Clearly it was 
7 Sec, e. g., Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F. 2d 935 (CAI 1966), 
rcv'd per curiam, 388 U. S. 449 (1967); United States v. 35 mm. 
Motion Picture Ji'ilm, 432 F. 2d 705 (CA2 1970), cert. dismissed sub nom. 
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thought that some conduct which would have gone un-
punished under M enioirs would result in conviction under 
Miller. 
This case is not strictly analogous to Bouie. The statu-
tory language there was "narrow and precise," 378 U. S., at 
352, and that fact was important to our holding that the 
expansive construction adopted by the State Supreme Court 
deprived the accused of fair warning. In contrast, the statute 
involved here always has used sweeping language to describe 
that which is forbidden. 8 But precisely because the statute 
is sweeping, its reach necessarily has been confined within 
the constitutional limits announced by this Court. Memoirs 
severely restricted its application. Miller also restricts its 
application beyond what the language might indicate, but 
Miller undeniably relaxes the Memoirs restrictions. The 
effect is the same as the new construction in Bouie. Peti-
United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., 403 U. S. 925 (1971) ; United 
States v. Ten Erotic Painti11os, 4:32 F. 2d 420 (C:\4 1970); Unit,·d States 
v. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577 (CA5 1973) ( en bane) (the 7 di~sc:1! i1!g judges 
and one judge concurring in the result-constituting a m:1jority on this 
issur-found that M cmoirs stated the governing standard), vacated and 
rrmancled for further consideration in light of Miller, 414 U. S. 969 
(1973); United States v. Pellrgrino, 467 F. 2d 41 (CA9 1972); South-
eastern Promotions Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CAlO 1972); 
IJuffman v. United States, 152 U. S. App. D. C 238, 470 F. 2d 386 
(1971), conviction reversed on other grounds upon rehearing a.Her Miller, 
163 U. S. App. D. C. 417, 502 F. 2d 419 (1974). Cf. Grove Press, Inc. 
v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F. 2d 82 (CA3 1969); Cinccom Theaters 
Midwest States, Inc. v. City nf Fort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 1973); 
Luros v. United States, 389 F. 2d 200 (CA8 1968). 
8 The statute proYiclcs in pertinent part: 
"Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commcree for 
the purpose of sale or di~tribution any obsrcnc, lewd, lnscivious, or filthy 
book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, pri 1t, silhouette, 
drawing, figure, imnge, cast, phonograph rerording, electrical transcription 
or other article capable of producing sound or nny other matter of inde-
cent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or impris-
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tioners, engaged in the business of marketing dicey films, had 
no fair warning that their products might be subjected to the 
new standards.9 
We have taken special care to insist on fair warning when 
a statute regulates expression and implicates First Amend-
ment values. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 40-41 
(1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573 (1974). Sec-
tion 1465 is such a statute. We therefore hold, in accord-
ance with Bouie, that the Due Process Clause precludes the 
application to petitioners of the standards announced in 
Miller v. California, to the extent that those standards may 
impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under 
Memoirs. Specifically, since the petitioners were indicted for r 
0 In Hamling we rejected a challenge based on Bouie v. City of Co-
lumbia, supra, superfi("ially similar to the challenge that is sustained here. 
418 U. S., at 115-116. But the similarity is superficial only. There the 
petitioners focused on part (b) of the Miller test. They argued that 
their convictions could not stand because Miller requires that the cate-
gories of material punishable under the statute must he specifically 
enumerated in the statute or in authoritative judicial construction. No 
such limiting construrtion had been announ0ed at the time they rngaged 
in the conduct that led to their convictions. We held that this made 
out no claim under Bouie, for part (b) did not expand the reach of the 
statute. "[Tlhe enwneration of specific categories of material in Miller 
whirh might be found obscene did not purport to make criminal, for the 
purpose of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, conduct which had not previously been 
thought criminal." 418 U. S., at 116. 
For the reasons noted in text, the same cannot be said of part (c) of 
the Miller trst, shifting from "utterly without redeeming social rnlue'" 
to "l::icks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." This was 
implicitly recognized by the Court in Ilarnling itself. There the trial 
took place before Miller, and the jury had been instructed in accordancr 
with Memoirs. Its verdict necessarily meant that it found the matrrials 
to be utterly without redeeming social value. This Court examined i he 
record and determined that the jury's verdict "was supported by the 
e,·idence and consistent with the Memoirs formulation of obscenity." 
418 U. S., at 100. We did not avoid that inquiry on the grounds that 
Memoirs had no relevance, as we might have done if Miller applied 
retroactively in all respects. 
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conduct occurring prior to our decision in Miller, they are / 
entitled to jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless 
it finds that the materials involved are "utterly without 
redeeming social value." 10 At the same time we reaffirm our 
holding in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 102, that 
"any constitutional principle enunciated in Miller which 
would serve to benefit petitioners must be applied in their 
case." 11 
Accordingly, the case is remanded for further proceedings' 
consistent with this opinion.12 
10 The Court of Appeals stated, apparently without viewing the mate-
rials them•elves, 520 F. 2d, at 932 n. 1 (MrCree, J., dissenting), that in 
its view the materials here were obscene under either M cmoirs or Miller. 
520 F. 2d, at 922. Such a conclusion, absent other dependable means of 
knowing the character of the materi:ds, is of dubiom value. But even 
if we accept the courL's co11clusion, under these circumstances it is not 
an adequate substitute for 1.hc decision in the first instance of a properly 
instructed jury, as to this important clement of the offense under 18 
U. S. C. § 1465. 
11 The Court of Appeals apparently thought that our remand in Miller 
and the companion casPS ncces~arily meant that Miller standards were 
fully retroactive. 520 F. 2d, at 920. But the passage from Ilamling 
quoted in the text, which simply reaffirms a principle implicit in Miller, 
makes it clear that the remands carried no such implication. Our 1973 
cases were remanded for the courts below to apply the "benefits" of 
Miller. Sec n. 3, supra. 
12 In view of our disposition of the case, we have no occasion to reach 
the other que.-,tions pre~ented in the petition. 
CHAM B ERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.prtntt QJ4tttri d tlrt "1ri.ttb .ibttt• 
.. it.efti:ttghm. J. (!J. 2llffe'!' 
January 14, 1977 
Re: No. 75-708 - Marks v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
I voted to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
at Conference, but think you have written up more persuasively 
than I thought could be done the arguments for reversal. I 
can subscribe to what I understand are the two basic 
premises of your opinion: (1) the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment prohibits the conviction of a defendant 
through an unforeseeable judicial expansion of a statute 
defining criminal liabi i -t:y'; (2) notwithstanding the fact 
that 18 u.s.c. § 1465 prohibiting the transportation of 
obscene materials has not been amended, its broad language 
was necessarily confined by the decisions of this Court 
determining what is, and what is not, obscenity. Although 
the formulation of that test in Memoirs never attracted a 
majority of the Court, a process of vote counting makes 
clear that after that decision and before Miller this Court 
would not affirm a conviction which did not satisfy the test 
stated by the Memoirs plurality. 
My only difficulty with your opinion is the related 
problem which we wrestled with last Term in the per curiam 
which I wrote in Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48. Frequently a 
criminal statute will be sufficiently general in its 
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language so as to support any one of several reasonable 
constructions. When the court of last resort of a particular 
state comes to construe a particular section or clause of a 
statute for the first time, it should not be unconstitutional 
for it to prefer the broadest, rather than the narrowest, 
of the reasonable constructions. 
Nothing you say in your opinion expressly militates 
against this proposition, but I would like to have it pointed 
out in some way that the opinion casts no doubt upon it. 
If you are amenable to such a comment, you are doubtless in 
a better position than I am to decide what it should be and 
where it should go. I will then be happy to join you. If 
you decide not to, I will presumably be relegated to the role 
of a voice crying in the wilderness. 
Since the Chief, Byron, and Harry have already joined 
you, I am sending copies of this letter to them. 
Sincerely, ~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.in;rrtmt (Q:curl cf tqt 'JRttltt~ ~hrlttt 
Jhtttqhtgfon. ,. <q:. 2!lffe)l,~ 
January 26, 1977 
Re: No. 75-708 - Marks v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
Your suggested additional footnote in the 
above case is all right with me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to: The Chief Justice 






No. 75-708 Marks v. United States 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for yours of January 14, which 
neglected. 
1 
Ai'though 1 11 perceive no incompatibility or tension . 
between~ v't Locke, 423 U.S. 48 and what I have written ,· 
, in this case, I am willing - if my ·'joiners ·' concur - to ~, 
add a footnote as indicated on the enclosed xerox of page 7 
of my opinion. -~ 
,, tl 
If this is 
others who have 
and recirculate 
agreeable, and unless I 
joined the opinion, 
later this week. 
cc: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
hear objection from i ~1' t 













.§u:;runu <qonrt ttf t4t ~th .§tat.ts 
jlasfrington, tE}. <q. 2.0ffe'-1-~ 
CHAMBE RS OF' 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
January 26, 1977 
No. 75-708 Marks v. United States 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for yours of January 14, which I have 
neglected. 
Although I perceive no incompatibility or tension 
between Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 and what I have written 
in this case, I am willing - if my "joiners" concur - to 
add a footnote as indicated on the enclosed xerox of page 7 
of my opinion. 
If this is agreeable, and unless I hear objection from 
others who have joined the opinion, I will add this footnote 
and recirculate later this week. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Sincerely, 
~nprtnu ~iru:d cf tlrt ~ttittb ~tafts 
11Jaslrhtgfon, l[l. ~. 2llffeJ1-;t 
CHAM8ERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 27. 1977 






Mr. Justice Brennan 





.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tutt ~Mtrl irf ur~ ~ttittb ~ta:ttg 
.Mfytttgfott, ~. ~. 2.llffe~~ 
Re: No. 75-708 - Marks v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
January 27, 1977 
/ 
The addition of the footnote has my approval. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 





JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.i'u:p:rtutt (!Iltttrl ltf tlrt 1tni:ttb .itatts 
:Jilasfrington. ~. (!I. 2llffe'!$ 
January 28, 1977 
Re: No. 75-708 - Marks v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for your letter of January 26th, responding 
to my earlier letter suggesting the addition of a footnote. 
I quite agree that there is no incompatibility or tension 
between Rose v. Locke and your present circulating draft; 
my reason for wanting some mention of the former case is 
that Bill Brennan's dissent there which took a very expansive 
view of the opinion he had written for the Court in Bouie, 
claimed that we were doing an injustice to the latter opinion. 
Since your present draft relies very much on Bouie, and 
rightly so, I thought it desirable to include a reference 
to Rose v. Locke as indicating that there are some outer 
limits to the Bouie doctrine. 
The proposed footnote on page 7 of the circulating draft 
which you attached to your letter of January 26th is agreeable 
to me. I think it would seem less "out of the blue" if a 
phrase could be added summarizing the holding of Rose v. 
Locke, but if you prefer to leave the footnote just the way 
you have drafted it, I will join in any event. My preference 
would be to add the following language so the footnote 
you have drafted would read this way: 
I 
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"For this reason, the instant case is different 
from Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1976), where 
the broad reading of the statute at issue did 
not upset a previously established narrower 
construction." 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
... , 
I 
~ttpftutt Qj:01lri af tlrt ,mttb .ibdts 
-asltinghm. J. Qj:. 2llffe~, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 28, 1977 
Re : No. 75-708 - Marks v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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U 'ted St t . of Appeals for the Sixth 111 a es. c· 't lrCUl . 
[January -, 1977] 
PER CuRrAM. 
This case presents the question, not fully answered in 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), whether the 
standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 
(1973), are to be applied retroactively to the potential detri-
ment of a defendant in a, criminal case. We granted certio-
rari, 424 U. S. 942 (1976), to resolve a conflict in the 
circuits.1 
1 Two Courts of Appeals have found instructions derived from Miller 
appropriate in prosecutions based on conduct occurring before the Miller 
decision came down: United States v. Marks, 520 F. 2d 913 (CA6 1975) 
(the instant case); and United States v. Friedman, 528 F. 2d 784 (CAlO 
1976), petition for cert. pending, No. 75-1663. Three Courts of Appeals 
have reversed convictions where Miller instructions were given by the 
District Court: United States v. Wasserman, 504 F. 2d 1012 (CA5 1974); 
United States v. Jacobs, 513 F. 2d 564 (CA9 1974); United States v. 
Sherpix, Inc., 168 U. S. App. D. C. 121, 512 F. 2d 1361 (1975). 
In two earlier cases both conduct and tria1 occurred prior to Miller, 
and the jury instructions were derived from Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 
383 U. S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion). United States v. Thevis 
(Thevis I), 484 F. 2d 1149 (CA5 1973), cert denied, 418 U. S. 932 
(1974); United States v. Palladino, 490 F. 2d 499 (CAI 1974). The 
Courts of Appeals there, foreshadowing to some extent our later decision 
in Hamling v. United States, supra, held that Miller did not void all 
Memoirs-based convictions, but that on review, appellants were entitled 
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I 
Petitioners were charged with several counts of tr+ ort-
ing obscene materials in interstate commerce, in violafaon of 
18 U. S. C. § 1465, and with conspiracy to transport such 
materials,,l18 U. S. C. § 371. The conduct that founded 
the charges covered a period through February 27, 1973. 
Trial did not begin until the following October. In the in-
terim, on June 21, 1973, this Court decided Miller v. Cali-
fornia, supra, and its companion cascs. 2 Miller announced 
n'ew standards for "isolat[ing] 'hard core' pornography from 
·expression protected by the First Amendment." 413 U. S., 
·at 29.3 That these new standards would also guide the 
!Jamling, 418 U. S., at 102. In later cases presenting similar facts, the 
Fifth Circuit has applied it;; holding in Thevis I. See, e. g., United 
·States v. Linetsky, 533 F. 2d 192 (CA5 1976); United States v. Thevis 
(Thevis II) , 526 F. 2d 989 (CA5 1976), petition for cert. pending, No. 
·75-1600. See also United States v. Hill, 500 F. 2d 733 (CA5 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975). And the Ninth Circuit, following Ilamling, 
has reached the same result. United States v. Cutting, 538 F. 2d 835 
{CA9 1976) (en bane). 
2 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U: S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. 
California, 413 U. S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of 
Fi:lm, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973). 
3 Miller held : 
"The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to . the prurient interest ... ; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct speeifically defined by the !IPPlicable ·state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as n whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.'; 413 U. S.; at 24. 
Under part (b) of the test,. it is adequate if the statute, as written or 
as judicially construed, specifically defines the sexual conduct, depiction 
'bf which is forbidden. The Court in Miller offered examples of what 
n. State might constitutionally choose to regulate: 
"(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate 
Sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. 
"(b) Patently offensive representations or dC8criptions of masturbation1 
? 
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future interpretation of the federal obscenity laws was clear 
from United States v. 12 200-foot Reeds of Film, 413 U. S. 
123, 129- 130, and n. 7 (1973), decided the same day as Miller. 
See Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 105, 113-114. 
Petitioners argued in the District Court that they were 
entitled to jury instructions not under Miller, but under the 
more favorable formulation of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).4 Memoirs, in their 
view, authoritatively stated the law in effect prior to Miller, 
by which petitioners charted their course of conduct. They 
focused in particular on the third part of the Memoirs test. 
Under it, expressive material is constitutionally protected 
unless it is "utterly without redeeming social value." 383 
U. S., at 418. Under Miller the comparable test is "whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value." 413 U. S., at 24. Miller, 
petitioners argue, casts a significantly wider net than 
Memoirs. To apply Miller retroactively, and thereby punish 
conduct innocent under Memoirs, violates the Due Process 
' Clause of the Fifth Amendment-much as retroactive appli-
cation of a new statute to penalize conduct innocent when 
.performed would violate the Constitution's ban on ex post 
facto laws, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., § 10, cl. 1. The District 
' Court overruled these objections and instructed the jury 
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U. S., 
at 25. 
4 The plurality in Memoirs held that "three elements must coalesce" 
if material is to be found obscene and therefore outside the protection of 
the First Amendment: 
"it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material 
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient intrrest in sex; (b) the material 
is patently offensive because iL affronts contemporary community stand-
ards relating 1.o the description or representation of sexual matters; and 
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under the Miller standards. Petitioners were convicted,5 and 
a divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
520 F. 2d 913 (1975). We now reverse. 
II 
The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers 
of the legislature, sec Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 ( 1798), and 
does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of 
government. Frank v. Ma.ngum, 237 U. S., 309, 344 (1915). 
But the principle on which the clause is based-the notion 
that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct 
which will give rise to criminal penalties-is fundamental to 
our concept of constitutional liberty. See United States v. 
Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). As such, that right is protected 
against judicial action by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. In Bo'uie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 
347 (1964) , a case involving the cognate provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, we reversed trespass convictions, 
finding that they rested on an unexpected construction of the 
·state trespass statute by the State Supreme Court. We 
held: 
"[A] n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal 
statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an 
ex post facto law such as Art. I, § 10, of the Constitu-
tion forbids. . . . If a state legislature is barred by 
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it 
must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the 
Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same 
result by judicial construction." Id., at 353-354. 
Similarly, in Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313 (1972), 
we reversed a conviction under a state obscenity law because 
5 Petitioner American News Co., Inc., was convicted only on the con-
spiracy charge. The other four petitioners were convicted of conspiracy 
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it rested on an unforeseeable judicial construction of the 
statute. We stressed that reversal was mandated because 
affected citizens lacked fair notice that the statute would 
be thus applied. 
Relying on Bouie, petitioners assert that Miller and its 
companion cases unforeseeably expanded the reach of the 
federal obscenity statutes beyond what was punishable under 
Memoirs. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It 
noted-correctly-that the Memoirs standa.rds never com-
manded the assent of more than three Justices at any one 
time, and it ap parently concluded from this fact that 
Memoirs never became the law. By this line of reasoning, 
one must judge whether Miller expanded criminal liability 
by looking not to Memoirs, but to Roth v. United States, 
354 U. S. 476 (1957), the last plenary decision of this 
Court prior to Miller in which a majority united in a single 
opinion announcing the rationale behind the Court's holding. 6 
Although certain language in Roth formed the basis for 
plurality's formulation in Memoirs, Roth's test for distin-
guishing obscenity from protected speech was a fairly simple 
one to articulate: "whether to the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of 
the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient in-
terest." Id., at 489. If indeed Roth, not Memoirs, stated 
the applicable law prior to Miller, there would be much to 
commend the :wva.ren,t view of the Court of Appeals that 
Miller did not significantly change the law. 
But we think the basic premise for this line of reasoning 
is faulty. When a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
6 Shortly after Memoirs, in response to the divergence of opinion among 
Members of the Court, we began the practice of disposing of obscenity 
cases in brief per curiam decisions. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 
(1967), was the first. At least 31 cases were decided in this fashion. 
They are collected in Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 82-83, 
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five justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds .... " Gregg v. Georgia, 
- U.S.-, - n. 15 (1976) (opinion of STEWART, POWELL, 
and STEVENS, JJ.). Three Justices joined in the controlling 
opinion in Memoirs. Two others, Mr. Justice Black and 
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred on broader grounds in revers-
1ng the judgment below. 383 U. S., at 421, 424. They re-
iterated their well-known position that the First Amendment 
provides an absolute shield against governmental action aimed 
at suppressing obscenity. MR. JUSTICE STEWART also con-
-Curred in the judgment, based on his view that only "hard-
core pornography" may be suppressed. Id., at 421. Sec 
Ginzburg v. United Slates, 383 U. S. 463, 499 (1966) 
'(STEWART, J., dissenting). The view of the Memoirs plural-
1.ty therefore constituted the holding of the Court and pro-
vided the governing standards. Indeed, every Court of Ap-
peals that considered the question between Memoirs and 
Miller so read our decisions.1 Thus, materials were deemed 
to be constitutionally protected unless the prosecution carried 
the burden of proving that they were "utterly without re-
deeming social value," and otherwise satisfied the stringent 
Memoirs requirements. 
Memoirs therefore was the law. Miller did not simply 
clarify Roth; it marked a significant departure from Memoirs. 
And there can be little doubt that the third test announced 
in Miller-whether the work "lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value"-e:xpanded criminal liability. 
The Court in Miller expressly observed that the "utterly 
without redeeming social value" test places on the prosecutor 
"a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal 
standards of proof.'' 413 U. S., at 22. Clearly it was 
7 • See, e. g., Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F. 2d 935 (CAl 1966), 
rev'd per curiam, 388 U. S. 449 (1967); United States v. 35 mm. 
Motion Picture Film, 432 F. 2d 705 (CA2 1970), cert. dismis ·cd sub nom. 
') 
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thought that some conduct which would have gone un-
punished under Memoirs would result in conviction under 
Miller. 
United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., 403 U. S. 925 (1971); United 
States v. 'l'en Erotic Paintings, 432 F. 2d 420 (CA4 1970); United States 
v'. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577 (CA5 1973) (en bane) (the 7 dissenting judges 
~d one judge concurring in the result-constituting a majority on this 
issue-found that Memoirs sta1ed the governing standard), vacated and 
remanded for further consideration in light of Miller, 414 U. S. 969 
(1973); United States v. Pellegrino, 467 F. 2d 41 (CA9 1972); South-
eastern Promotions Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CAIO 1972); 
Huffman v. United States, 152 U. S. App. D. C 238, 470 F. 2d 386 
(1971), conviction reversed.' on other grounds upon rehearing after Miller, 
163 U.S. App. D. C. 417, 502 F. 2d 419 (1974). Cf. Grove Press, Inc . 
v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F. 2d 82 (CA3 1969); Cinecom Theaters 
· Midwest States, Inc. v. 0ity of Flort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 1973); 
/AJJ.:..os v. United States, 389 F. 2d' 200 (CA8 1968). 
~-------~dll:n Hamling we rejected a challenge based on Bouie v. City of Co-
. lumbia, supra, superfieially similar to the challenge that is susta.ined here. 
418 U. S., at 115-116: But the 8imilarity is superficial only. There the 
:petitioners focused on part (b) of the Miller test. They argued that 
their convictions could not stand because Miller requires that the cate-
gories of material punishable under the statute must be specifically 
enumerated in the statute or in authoritative judicial construction. No 
such limiting cons1ruction had been announced at the time they engaged 
in the conduct that led to their convictions. We held that this made 
out no claim ttnder Bouie, for part (b) did not expand the reach of the 
statute. "[Tlhe enumeration of specific ca1egories of material in Miller 
which might be found obscene did not purport to make criminal, for the 
pt\rpose of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, conduct which had not previom,ly been 
thought criminal." 418 U. S., at 116. 
For the reasons noted in text, the same cannot be said of part (c) of 
the Miller test, shifting from "utterly without redeeming social value" 
to "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." This was 
implicitly recognized by the Court in Ilamling itself. There the trial 
took place before Miller, and the jury had been instructed in accordance 
with Memoirs. Its verdict necessarily meant that i1 found the materials 
to be utterly without redeeming social value. This Court examined the 
record and determined that the jury's verdict "was supported by the 
evidence and consistent with the Memoirs formulation of obscenity." 
8 
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This case is not strictly analogous to Bouie. The statu-
tory langua.ge there was "narrow and precise," 378 U. S., at 
352, and that fact was important to our holding that the 
expansive construction adopted by the State Supreme Court 
deprived the accused of fair warning, In contrast, the statute 
"involved here always has used sweeping language to describe 
that which is forbidden.1> But precisely because the statute 
is sweeping, its reach necessarily has been confiined within 
'the constitutional limits announced by this Court. Memoirs 
severely restficted its application. Miller also restricts its 
'applicatio:µ b(,)yond what the language might indicate, but 
'it cannot be denied that Miller relaxes the Memoirs restric-
tions. The effect is the same as the new construction in 
Bouie. Petitioners, engaged in the business of marketing 
dicey films, had no fair warni~g that their products might 
be subjected to the new standards. 
We have taken special care to ii;isist on fair warning when 
·a statute regulates expression and implicates First Amend-
"inent values. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 40-41 
(1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573 (1974). Sec-
"tion 1465 is such a statute. We therefore hold, in accord-
'ance with Bouie, that the Due Process Clause precludes the 
application to petitioners of the standards announced in 
Miller v. California, to the extent. that those standards may 
impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under 
418 U. S., at 100. We did not avoid that inquiry on the grounds that 
Memoirs had no relevance, as we might have done if Miller applied 
retroactively in all respec,ts. . 
0 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
. "Whoever knowingly tran~ports in intersta.te or foreign commerce for 
the pur·pose of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lasciviou , or filthy 
b_ook, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, 
drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription 
or other n.rticle capable of producing sound or any other matter of inde-
cent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or impris-
6ned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 1465. 
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Memoirs. Specifically, petitioners are entitled to jury in-
structions requiring the jury to acquit unless it finds that the 
materials involved are "utterly without redeeming social 
value." 10 At the same time we reaffirm our holding in 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 102, that "any con-
stitutional principle enunciated in Miller which would serve 
to benefit petitioners must be applied in their case." 11 
Reversed and remanded.i2 
10 Tt1e Court of AppeaJs stated, apparently without viewing the mate-
ri:als themselves, 520 F. 2d, at 932 n. 1 (McCree, J., dissenting), that in 
its view the materials here were obscene under either Memoirs or Miller. 
520 F. 2d, at 922. Such a conclusion, absent other dependable means of 
knowing the character of the materials, is of dubious value. But even 
if we accept the court's conclusion, under these circumstances it is not 
an adequate substitute for the decision in the first instance of a properly 
instructed jury, as to this important element of the offense under 18 
U. S. C. § 1465. 
11 The Court of Appeals apparently thought that our remand in Miller 
and the companion cases necessarily meant that Miller standards were 
fully retroactive. 520 F. 2d, at 920. But the passage from Hamling 
quoted in the text, which simply reaffirms a principle implicit in Miller, 
makes it clear that the remands carried no such implication. Our 1973 
cases were remanded for the courts below to apply the "benefits" of 
Miller. See n. 3, supra. 
12 In view of our disposition of the case, we have no occasion to reach 
the other two questions presented in the petition. 
3rd DRAFT 
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This case presents the question, not fully answered in 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), whether the 
standards announced in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 
(1973), are to be applied retroactively to the potential detri-
ment of a defendant in a criminal case. We granted certio-
rari, 424 U. S. 942 (1976), to resolve a conflict in the 
circuits.1 
1 Two Courts of Appeals have found instructions derived from Miller 
appropriate in prosecutions based on conduct occurring before the Miller 
decision came down: United States v. Maries, 520 F. 2d 913 (CA6 1975} 
(the instant case); fl,nd United States v. Friedman, 528 F. 2d 784 (CAlO 
1976), petition for cert. pending, ~o. 75-H\63. Thrre Courts of Appeals 
have revcri,;cd convictions where Miller instructions were given by the 
Di;;trict Court: United States v. Wasserman, 504 F. 2d 1012 (CA5 1974); 
United States v. Jacobs, 5i3 F. 2d 564 (CA9 1974); United States v. 
Sherpix, Inc., 168 U. S. App. D. C. 121, 512 F. 2d 1361 (1975). 
In two earlier cases both conduct and trial orcurrcd prior to Miller, 
nnd the jury instrnctions were derived from Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 
383 U. S. 413 (1966) (plt\rnlity opinion). United States v. Thevis 
(Thevis I) , 484 F. 2d i149 (CA5 1973), cert denied, 418 U. S. 932 
(1974); United Stat·es v. Palladino, 490 F. 2d 499 (CAI 1974). The 
Courts of Appeals there, forr.;hadowing to some cxtrnt our later decision 
in Hamling v. United States, supra, held that, Miller did not void all 
j\1 emoirs-based convictions, but that on review appellants were entitled 
to all tho bcn<.'fits oJ both tb.o Miller and Memoirs standards. Seo 
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I 
Petitioners were charged with several counts of transport~ 
ing obscene materials in interstate commerce, in violation of 
18 U. S. C. § 1465, and with conspiracy to transport such 
materials, 18 U. S. C. § 371. The conduct that gave rise to 
the charges covered a period through February 27, 1973. 
Trial did not begin until the following October. In the in-
terim, on June 21, 1973, this Court decided Miller v. Cali-
fornia, supra, and its companion cases. 2 Miller announced 
new standards for "isolat[ing] 'hard core' pornography from 
expression protected by the First Amendment." 413 U. S., 
at 29.3 That these new standards would also guide the 
Hamling, 418 U. S., at 102. In later cas<'s presenting similar facts, the 
Fifth Circuit has applied its holding in Thevis I. See, e. g., United 
States v. Linetsky, 533 F. 2d 192 (CA5 1976); United States v. Thevis 
(Thevis II), 526 F. 2d 989 (CA5 Hl76), petition for crrt. pending, No. 
75-1600. See also United States v. Hill, 500 F. 2d 733 (CA5 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975). And the Ninth Circuit, following Hamling, 
has reached the same result. United .States v. Cutting, 538 F. 2d 835 
(CA9 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 45 U.S. L. W. 3464 (Jan. 10, 1977). 
2 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. 
California, 413' U. S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of 
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973). 
8 Miller held : 
"The basic guidelines for the trier of fact mm;t be: (a) whrther 'the 
average per~on, applying contemporary community ;,tandnrds' would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prnricnt intrrrst ... ; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work. taken as fl whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value." 413 U. S., at 24. 
Under part (b) of thr test, ii is adequate if the statute, as written or 
as judicially construed, specifically defines th<> sexual conduct, depiction 
of which is forbidden. The Court in Miller offered examples of what 
a State might constitutionally choose to regulate: 
"(a) Patently offensive reprc.,;entations or descriptions of ultimate 
iiexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. 
'' (Q) Patently offensive reprcsrntations or descriptions of masturbation, 
. ti 
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future interpretation of the federal obscenity laws was clear 
from United States v. 12 200-foot Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 
123, 129-130, and n. 7 (1973), decided the same day as Miller. 
See Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 105, 113-114. 
Petitioners argued in the District Court that they were 
entitled to jury instructions not under Miller, but under the 
more favorable formulation of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion). 4 Memoirs, in their 
view, authoritatively stated the law in effect prior to Miller, 
by which petitioners charted their course of conduct. They 
focused in particular on the third part of the Memoirs test. 
Under it, expressive material is constitutionally protected 
unless it is "utterly without redeeming social value." 383 
U. S., at 418. Under Miller the comparable test is "whether 
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value.)) 413 U. S., at 24. Miller, 
petitioners argue, casts a significantly wider net than 
Memoirs. • To apply Miller retroactively, and thereby punish 
conduct innocent under Memoirs, violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment-much as retroactive appli-
cation of a new statute to penalize conduct innocent when 
performed would violate the Constitution's ban on ex post 
facto laws, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id., § 10, cl. 1. The District 
Court overruled these objections and instructed the jury 
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 413 U. S., 
at 25. 
4 The plurality in Memoirs lield that "three elements must coalesce"· 
if material is to be found obscene and therefore outside the protection of 
the First Amendment: 
"it must be established that '(a) the dominant theme of the material 
taken as a whole appeals to a ·prurient intrrest in sex; (b) the material 
i':i patently offensive because it affronts cont.cmporary community stand-
ards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; ani:l' 
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under the Miller standards. Petitioners were convicted,5 anq 
a divided Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 
520 F. 2d 913 (1975). We now reverse. 
II 
The Ex Post Facto Clause is a limitation upon the powers 
of the legislature, see Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385 ( 1798), and 
does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of 
government. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S., 309, 344 (1915). 
But the principle on which the clause is based-the notion 
that persons have a right to fair warning of that conduct 
which will give rise to criminal penalties-is fundamental to 
our concept of constitutional liberty. See United States v. 
Harriss, 347 U. S. 612', 617 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939). As such, that right is protected 
against judicial action by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 
347 (1964), a case involving the cognate provision of the 
Fourteenth Amehdment, the Court reversed trespass convic-
tions, finding that they rested on an unexpected construction 
of the state trespass statute by the State Supreme Court: 
"[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal 
statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an 
ex post facto law such a.s Att. l, §. 10, of the Constitu ...  
tion forbids. . . . If a state legislature is barred by 
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it. 
must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the 
Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same 
result by judicial construction." Id., at 353-354. 
Similarly, in Rabe v. Washington, 405 U. S. 313 (1972)'} 
we reversed a conviction under a state obscenity law because 
5 Petitioner American News Co., Inc., was convicted only on the con-
spiracy charge. The other four petitioners were convicted of ronspiracy.-
{lnd also 'on seven of the eight substantive cgi1nts. 
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it rested on an unforeseeable judicial construction of the 
statute. We stressed that reversal was mandated because 
affected citizens lacked fair notice that the statute would 
be thus applied. 
Relying on Bouie, petitioners assert that M-iller and its 
compa.nion cases unforeseeably expanded the reach of the 
federal obscenity statutes beyond what was punishable under 
Memoirs. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It 
noted-correctly-that the Memoirs standards never com-
manded the assent of more than three Justices at a.ny one 
time, and it apparently concluded from this fact that 
Memoirs never became the law. By this line of reasoning, 
one must judge whether Miller expanded criminal liability 
by looking not to Memoirs, but to Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476 (1957), the last comparable plenary decision of this 
Court prior to Miller in which a majority united in a single 
opinion announcing the rationale behind the Court's holding.ii 
Although certain language in Roth formed the basis for the 
plurality's formulation in Memoirs, Roth's test for distin-
guishing obscenity from protected speech was a fairly simple 
one to articulate: "whether to the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of 
the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient in-
terest." Id., at 489. If indeed Roth, not Memoirs, stated 
the applicable law prior to Miller, there would be much to 
commend the apparent view of the Court of Appea.ls that 
Miller did not significa,ntly change the law. 
But we think the basic premise for this line of reasoning 
is faulty. When a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
6 Shortly after Memoirs , in response to the divergence of opinion among 
Members of the Court , the Court began the practice of disposing of obscen-
ity cases in brief per curiam decisions. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 
767 (1967) , was the first. At least 31 cases were decided in this fashion. 
They are collected in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 82-83, 
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five Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds .... " Gregg v. Georgia, 
- U.S.-, - n. 15 (1976) (opinion of STEWART, PowELL, 
and STEVENS, JJ.). Three Justices joined in the controlling 
opinion in Memoirs. Two others, Mr. Justice Black and 
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurred on broader grounds in revers-
ing the judgment below. 383 U. S. , at 421, 424. They re-
iterated their well-known position that the First Amendment 
provides an absolute shield against governmental action aimed 
at suppressing obscenity. MR. JUSTICE STEWART also con-
curred in the judgment, based on his view that only "hard-
core pornography" may be suppressed. Id., at 421. See 
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 499 (1966) 
(STEWART, J., dissenting). 'The view of the Memoirs plural-
ity therefore constituted the holding of the Court and pro-
vided the governing standards. Indeed, every Court of Ap-
peals that considered the question between Memoirs and 
Miller so read our decisions.7 Ma.terials were deemed to 
be constitutionally protected unless the prosecution carried 
the burden of proving that they were "utterly without re-
deeming social value," and otherwise satisfied the stringent 
Memoirs requirements. 
Memoirs therefore was the law. Miller did not simply 
clarify Roth; it ma.rked a significant departure from Memoirs. 
And there can be little doubt that the third test announced 
in Miller-whether the work "lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value"-expanded criminal liability. 
The Court in Miller expressly observed that the "utterly 
without redeeming social value" test places on the prosecutor 
"a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal 
standards of proof." 413 U. S., at 22. Clearly it was 
7 See, e. g. , Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F . 2d 935 (CAI 1966) , 
rcv'd per c·uriam, 388 U. S. 449 (1967) ; Unit ed States v. 3/j mm, 
J'vf o{ion Picture Film,,, 432 f , 2<r705 (CA2 1970) , c~rt. dismissed sub noml 
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thought that some conduct which would have gone un-
punished under Memoirs would result in conviction under 
Miller. 
This case is not strictly analogous to Bouie. The statu-
tory language there was "narrow and precise," 378 U. S., at 
352, and that fact was important to our holding that the 
expansive construction adopted by the State Supreme Court 
deprived the accused of fair warning. In contrast, the statute 
involved here always has used sweeping language to describe 
that which is forbidden. 8 But precisely because the statute 
is sweeping, its reach necessarily has been confined within 
the constitutional limits announced by this Court. Memoirs 
severely restricted its application. Miller also restricts its 
application beyond what the language might indicate, but 
Miller undeniably relaxes the Memoirs restrictions.u The 
United States v. Unicorn Enterpl'ises, Inc., 403 U. S. 925 (1971); United 
States v. Ten Erotic Paintings, 432 F. 2d 420 (CA4 1970); United States 
v. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577 (CA5 1973) (en bane) (the 7 dissenting judges 
and one judge concurring in the re~ult-constituting a majority on this 
issue-found that Memoirs stated the governing standard), vacated and 
remanded for further consideration in light of Miller, 414 U. S. 969 
(1973); United States v. Pellegrino, 467 F. 2d 41 (CA9 1972); South-
eastern Promotions Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CAlO 1972); 
Huffman v. United States, 152 U. S. App. D. C 238, 470 F. 2d 386 
(1971), conviction reversed on other grounds upon rehearing after Miller, 
163 U.S. App. D. C. 417, 502 F. 2d 419 (1974). Cf. Grove Press, Inc. 
v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F. 2d 82 (CA3 1969); Cinecom Theaters 
Midwest States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F. 2d 1297 (CA7 1973); 
Luros v. United States, 389 F. 2d 200 (CA8 1968). 
8 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Whoever knowingly transports in interstnte or foreign comm<>rce for 
the purpose of sale or distribution any obscenr, lewd, lascivious, or filthy 
book, pamphlrt, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, 
drawing, figure, image, cast, phonogrnph recording, elt'ctrical transcription 
or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of inde-
cent or immoral charact<'r, shall br fined not more than $5,000 or impris-
<0ned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 1465. J 
ti For thi8 reason, the instant case i::; different from Rose v. Locke, 
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effect is the same as the new construction in Bouie. Peti-
tioners, engaged in the business of marketing dicey films, had 
no fair warning that their products might be subjected to the 
new standards. 10 
We have taken special care to insist on fair warning when 
a statute regulates expression and implicates First Amend-
ment values. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 40-41 
(1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573 (1974). Sec-
tion 1465 is such a statute. We therefore hold, in accord-
ance with Bouie, that the Due Process Clause precludes the 
application to petitioners of the standards announced in 
423 U. S. 48 (1976), where the broad reading of the statute at issue did f 
not upset a previously established narrower construction. 
10 In Hamling we rejected a challenge based on Bouie v. City of Co-
lumbia, supra, superficially similar to the challenge that is sustained here. 
418 U. S., at 115-116. But the similarity is superficial only. There the 
petitioners focused on part (b) of the Miller t<>st. Seen. 3, supra. They 
argued that their convictions could not stand because Miller requires that 
the categories of material punishable unde.r t.he statute must be specificnlly 
enumerated in the statute or in authoritative judicial construction. No, 
such limiting construction had been announced at the time they engaged 
in the conduct that led to their convictions. We held that this made 
out no claim under Bouie, for part (b) did not expand the reach of the 
statute. "[T]he enumeration of specifir categories of material in Miller 
which might be found obscene did not purport to make criminal, for the, 
purpose of 18 U. S. C. § 1461, conduct which had not previously been 
thought criminal:" 418 U. S., at 116. 
For the reasons noted in text, the same cannot be said of part ( c) of 
·the Miller test, shifting from "utterly without redeeming social value"' 
to "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." This was 
implicitly recognized by the Court in Hamling itself. There the trial 
took place before Miller, and the jury had been instructed in accordance, 
with Memoirs. Its verdict necessarily meant that it found the materials· 
to be utterly without redeeming social value. This Court examined the, 
record and determined that the jury's verdict "was supported by the, 
·evidence and consistent with the Memoirs formulation of obscenity." 
418 U. S., at 100. We did not avoid that inquiry on the grounds that 
Memoirs had. no relevance, as we might h.Q.ve done if Miller a.r,plied: 
tetroactively i!l all resl?ects. 
; 
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Miller v. California, to the extent that those standards may 
impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under 
Memoirs. Specifically, since the petitioners were indicted for 
conduct occurring prior to our decision in Miller, they are 
entitled to jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless 
it finds that the materials involved are "utterly without 
redeeming social value." 11 At the same time we affirm our 
holding in Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S., at 102, that 
"any constitutional principle enunciated in Miller which 
would serve to benefit petitioners must be applied in their 
case." 12 
Accordingly, the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.ia 
11 The Court of Appeals stated, appa.rently without viewing the mate-
rials themselves, 520 F. 2d, at 932 n. 1 (McCree, J., dissenting), that in 
its view the materials here were obscene under either Memoirs or Miller. 
520 F. 2d, at 922. Such a conclusion, absent ·other dependable means of 
knowing the character of the materials, is of dubious value. But even 
if we accept the court's conclusion, under tl1ese circumstances it is not 
an adequate substitute for the decision in the 'first instance of a properly 
instructed jury, as to this important element of the offense under 18 
U. S. C. § 1465. 
12 The Court of Appeals apparently thought that our remand in Miller 
and the companion cases necessarily meant that Miller standards were 
fully retroactive. 520 F. 2d, at 920. But the passage from Hamling 
.quoted in the text, which simply rea'fflrms a principle implicit in Miller., 
makes it clear that the remands carried no such implication. Our 1973 
cases were remanded for the courts below to apply the "benefits" ,of 
Miller. See n. 3, supra. 
13 In view of our disposition of t,he case, we, have no occasion to reach 
the other questions presented in the petition. 
lfp/ss 2/28/77 
75-708 Marks v United States 
The petitioners / operators of a movie theater in 
Newport, Kentucky,/ were charged with transporting obscene 
materials in interstate conn:nenc in violation of a federal 
statute. The alleged violation occurred in early 1973 ;' 
J~ 
before our decision in Miller v. California. I\ Miller 
I 
w-(/ 
announced new standards~ by which to decide whether 
allegedly obscene materials/ are protected by the First 
Amendment. 
The instructions to the jury ~ his cas~ were based 
on Miller, rather than the prior law. Since the conduct 
I 
at issue occurred before Miller, we think it was error to 
apply the Miller standards retroactively. 
We would not impose criminal liability for conduct 
not punishable der the earlier standards. We therefore 
reverse the convictions, and remand the case. 
Mr. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, in which Mr. Justice Stewart 
and Mr. Justice Marshall joined. Mr. Justice Stevens 
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MARKS ET AL. V. UNITED STATES 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR Tl 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
;_~ 
No. 75-708. Argued November 1-2, 1976-Decided March 1, 1977 
Petitioners were charged with transporting obscene materials in violation 
of a fiederal statute. The conduct that gave rise to the charge occurred. 
before Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, was decided, announcing new 
standards for "isolating 'hard core' pornography from expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment," id., at 29. Held: The Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes retroactive application to 
petitioners of the Miller standards, to the extent that those standards 
may impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable under the 
standards announced in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413. 
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 347. Specifically, petitioners are 
entitled to jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless it finds 
that the mat,erials involved are "utterly without redeeming social 
value." At the same time, any constitutional principle announced in 
Miller that would serve to benefit petitioners must be applied in their 
case. Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 102. Pp. 2-9. 
520 F. 2d 913, reversed and remanded. 
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed 
an opinion concurring in pa.rt and dissenting in pa.rt, in which S1'EWAR'r and 
MARSHALL, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. 
HEN f Decisions. 
Reporter · o _·:c.,.c· .. 
------···· 
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March 15, 1977 
Cases held for No. 75-708, Marks v. United States 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 75-1663, Friedman v. United States. Petr was 
convicted of transporting an obscene book in interstate 
commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1465. He initially was brought to 
trial before Miller v. California was decided. The jury was 
instructed W1der Memoirs v. Massachusetts, and it found him 
guilty. Before CAlO decided his appeal, the Miller decision 
was annoW1ced. CAlO vacated the first conviction, remanding 
to the District Court for reconsideration in light of Miller. 
It did not review the conviction; it simply vacated. 488 
F. 2d 1141. Petr was retried and thi~ time, over objection, 
the District Court gave instructions based solely on Miller. 
Petr appealed his conviction and CAlO affirmed, noting that 
petr had been found guilty under both sets of standards and 
stating that it thought the book was "filth" under any 
standard. 
The instructions at the second trial were erroneous under 
Marks. The first conviction cannot be used in support of the 
judgment since the vacation and remand for a new trial rendered: ~ 
the first c.onviction void. And the appellate court's determina-
tion that the book was obscene is not sufficient in these 
circumstances to sustain the conviction. Marks, slip op. at 
9, n. 11. I will vote to GRANT, VACATE and REMAND for 
reconsideration in light of Marks. 
* * * * 
No. 75-985, American Theatre Corp. v. United States. 
Petrs were convicted of transporting obscene materials by 
common carrier in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 1462. 
- 2 -
Apparently their conduct occurred after Miller, and there is 
no complaint about the Miller-based jury instructions. Petrs 
complain instead about CA.S's failure to view the materials -
two films - and make its own judgment whether or not they 
were obscene. CA.8 decided that the materials were obscene 
based only on a stipulation of ~ounsel listing the sexual 
activities portrayed in the films. Citing CA6's practice 
in Marks, CA.8 stated expressly that it had not viewed the 
films. Petn App. at A3, n. 2. 
In Marks we did not reach the question as to an appellate 
court's duty to view allegedly obscene materials, although the 
opinion may be viewed as impliedly critical of CA.6 on this 
score. Slip op. at 9, n. 11. Miller emphasized "the ultimate 
power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of 
constitutional claims when necessary." 413 U.S., at 25. 
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160, reaffirmed that 
position. But our cases do not establish guidelines for 
determining when appellate viewing is "necessary." If the 
Court wishes to address this issue, this case may .present a 
reasonably good opportunity. But there is the possibility 
that the SG will argue that a defendant who relied on a 
stipulation in the trial court cannot demand that an appellate 
court view the materials. See the SG's brief in Marks, at 
39, n. 21. 
On balance, I am inclined to Deny on this issue. 
The other questions presented challenge the 
of the evidence and the constitutionality of the 
permits the court to tax costs to the defendant. 
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thought that some conduct which would have gone un-
punished under Jvl emoirs would result in conYiction under 
Miller. 
This case is not strictly analogous to Bouie. The statu-
tory la.nguage there was "narrow and precise," 378 U. S. , at 
352, and that fact ,rns important to our holding that the 
expansive construction adopted by th e State Supreme Court 
deprived the accused of fair warning. In contrast, the statute 
involved here a1ways has used s,reeping la11guage to describe 
that " ·hich is forbidden. 8 But precisely because the statute 
is sweeping, its reach necessarily has been confined "·ithin 
the constitutional limits announced by this Court. M e1,wirs 
severely restricted its application. M iller also restricts its 
application beyond what the language might indicate, but 
Miller undeniably relaxes the Memoirs restrictions.* The 
effect is the same as the new construction in Boufa. Peti-
Unit ed States v. Unicorn Enterprises , Inc., 403 U.S. 925 (1971) ; Unit ed 
States v. Ten Erotic Paintings. 432 F . 2d 420 (C:\4 1970) ; Unit ed States 
v. Groner, 479 F. 2d 577 (CA5 1973) ( en bnnc) (the 7 dissenting judges 
and one judge concurring in the m ,ult- constituting a majority on this 
issuc--found that 1\1 emoirs :::t.ated the gO\·erning standard) , vacated and 
remanded for further considern.tion in light of Miller, 414 U. S. 969 
(1973); Unit ed States v. Pellegrino, 467 F . 2d 41 (CA9 1972) ; South-
eastern Promotions Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F. 2d 282 (CAIO 1972); 
Huffman v. Unit ed States, 152 U. S. App. D . C 238, 470 F. 2d 386 
(1971), conviction reversed on other grounds upon rehearing after Miller, 
163 U.S. App. D. C. 417, 502 F. 2d 419 (1974). Cf. Grove Press, Inc. 
v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F. 2d 82 (CA3 1969); Cinecom Theaters 
Midwest States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F . 2d 1297 (CA7 1973); 
Luros v. United States, 389 F . 2d 200 (CAB 1968) . 
8 The statute provides in pertinent part: 
"Whoever knowingly transpo1ts in interstate or foreign commerce for 
the purpose of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lnscivious, or filthy 
book, pnmphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, 
drawing, figure, imnge, cast., phonograph recording, electrical transcription 
or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of inde-
cent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both." 18 U. S. C. § 1465. 
*For this reason, the instant case is far 
different from Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 
(1976). 
r' d 
Note to Dave: 
I would make a change along the foregoing lines 
because changes in the personnel of the Court weaken the 
"five Justices" argument. The point is that the view of 
the Memoirs plurality was the holding of the Court and 
followed as such. 
~ Add a footnote, keyed to the first sentence above, 
citing as "for example" two or three of the cases cited 
in footnote 15 on page 30 of the SG's brief. 
.• 
•. 
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MARKS et al. v. UNITED STATES 
DRAFT SYLLAbUS 
(Ba::.i:u r,n uraft 
No. _ 3 of Lhe 
Opin on) 
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit 
No. 75-708. Argued November 1-2, 1976--Decided 
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment held to preclude 
retroactive application to petitioners in prosecution 
charging them with transporting obscene materials in 
violation of a federal statute, of standards announced 
in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, for "isolating 'hard 
core' pornography from expression protected by the First 
Amendment," id., at 29, to the extent that those standards 
may impose criminal liability for conduct not punishable 
under the standards announced in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 413. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 u. S. 347. 
Thus, petitioners, who were indicted for conduct occurring 
prior to the decision in Miller, are entitled to jury 
instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless it finds 
that the materials involved are "utterly without redeeming 
social value." 







Petitioners were charged with transporting obscene materials 
in violation of a federal statute. The conduct ~hich 
gave rise to the charge occurred before Miller v. California, 
\ 
413 U.S. 15, was decided, announcing new standards for 
"isolating 'hard core' pornography from expression protected 
by the First Amendment, 11 id., at 29. ~, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes retroactive applica-
tion to petitioners of the Miller standards, to the extent 
that those standards may impose criminal liability for conduct 
not punishable under the standards announced in Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347. Specifically, petitioners are entitled to 
jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless it 
finds that the materials involved are "utterly without 
redeeming social value. 11 At the same time, any constitutional. " 
principle announced .in Miller that would serve to benefit 
petitioners must be applied in their case. Hamling v. 
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102. 




~ r .. ; ....... 
'r'°;:, .. 




Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, 
in which Burger, C.J., White, Black.mun, and Rehnquist, 
JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part, in which Stewart and 
Marshall, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion 
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